metro GREAT SUMMER LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES! Witness To History A conversation with Ambassador Ross. Jackie Headapohl Managing Editor 1111111,01101 11lor 11111. 11111k 1111111i Ai dill III IIPBB•• DL- ly with 11175t7v id So lo ■ pmg 10 a.m. AI immi IP (Brunch & Learn): ■■ mm .7The Last 1,000 Years of I Jewish Philosophy" 11 111":30 p.m.1111111 NEI "The Whole OM. Nib Ai Jewish Histor y ill in Hour" i r ■■ r Viiclulc-1 L.. l ■ fill1L-SL TuLttitiavti. 1111 IIP"; , ; IIII rp e. 6.. 10-11:30 a.m.: "Judaism & the Roots of Islam" • Session 1: Judaism in Pre-Muslim Arabia • Session 2: Torah Stories in the Koran • Session 3: Jewish Life in the Muslim World Information/Tickets: 248.661.1900 or theberman.org Jewish Community Center D. Dan & Betty Kahn Building Eugene & Marcia Applebaum Jewish Community Campus 6600 W. Maple Road West Bloomfield, MI 48322 ASAJE ► ]."eisi THE CENTE (Th FedEdAMI we Del ve A 1 I le% h F71 n Jewish Federation OF METROPOLITAN DETROIT AIN.. .1 Or Jew(611EduCatiOn 1922780 24 June 5 • 2014 A mbassador Dennis Ross — a Middle East adviser to Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama — has been named the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's inaugural William Davidson Distinguished Fellow. The three-year fellowship, announced in January, was made possible through a $1.2-million grant to the institute by the Detroit-based William Davidson Foundation. As the Davidson Distinguished Fellow, Ross' research will focus on such critical issues in the Middle East as the challenge of Iran's nuclear program, the Israeli- Palestinian peace process and shaping the U.S.-Israel relationship. In 2000, Ross assisted President Bill Clinton when he tried, unsuccessfully, to reach a peace agreement between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority head Yasser Arafat. Most recent- ly, Ross was an adviser to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia in the first Obama admin- istration. Ross was in Detroit in late May to meet the board of directors of the Davidson Foundation. While here, he sat down with the Jewish News to answer some questions. Q: What do you see as the best-case scenario when it comes to peace between Israelis and Palestinians? For those that say this is the last moment for a two-state solution, I say to them, "Did I miss something? Are the Israelis going someplace? Are the Palestinians going someplace?" As long as they're both going to be there, there isn't another outcome that doesn't provide for two states for two people. But if we can't achieve that right now, then what do we do? If formal agreements are too hard to do, and I think right now that may be the case, then the answer isn't to try to push for formal agreements, and the answer isn't to say let them stew in their own juices and walk away. The answer is to focus on practical steps that can prevent a deterioration and that may allow you to change the circumstances so what you can't achieve today you can achieve over time. If the prime minister of Israel says he will not allow Israel to become a binational state, then he can adopt positions that would broker parallel steps. Here's an example of what I mean. Maybe the Israelis could open up Area C in the West Bank. Area A is where the Palestinians retain civil and security responsibility. Today it's about 18.2 percent of the West Bank. Area B is an area in which Palestinians have civil and law and order responsibility, but not responsibility for terror; that's about 27.1 percent. Area C is where Israelis retain all responsibility and that's 60.1 percent of the West Bank. The Israelis could change the designa- tion, so that more of C becomes like B or, if they didn't want to do something that formal, they could simply say that they were going to allow the Palestinians to build or to do planning and zoning in Area C, or they would allow the Palestinians to own rock quarries in Area C because stone masonry is a big industry for Palestinians, and all the rock quarries in the West Bank are in Area C. Israelis could tell us they were will- ing to do that, and we could talk to the Palestinians and say if the Israelis do that — which is of value to you and doesn't require formal agreements — will you agree to forego all actions at international conventions and organizations? You could have a quiet set of under- standings that either side could revoke if the other broke the rules. The point is: Something like that would prevent deterioration and create further stakes in cooperation. And you create a dif- ferent set of realities that could be positive for the future. Q: What are your thoughts about the planned unification of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority? [Note: The two entities did reach an agreement on June 1, after this interview.] This is at least the fourth reconciliation agreement, so whether or not it will actu- ally materialize remains to be seen. If it does, I think the key thing to watch for is not whether there's a technocratic govern- ment that has no Hamas members in it. The key will be: Is Hamas allowed to become part of the PLO without having to adopt the conditions of the PLO — a two- state outcome, a renunciation of violence and recognition of Israel's right to exist? If Hamas is allowed to become part of the PLO without having to meet those con- ditions, that would be quite inconsistent with trying to reconcile one's commitment to two states. As to timing, why not come to Secretary of State John Kerry before you agree to this. To surprise the U.S. was, frankly, unaccept- able. Ambassador Dennis Ross international engagement, and Secretary Clinton is the same. To define her, she thinks this is the wrong time to think about retrenching. Q: Do you think it's possible that Iran will give up its nuclear arms program? Of course, they claim they don't have a nuclear arms program. If you ask me, "Is it possible for them to make adjustments in their behavior?" Then yes, it's possible. Let's recall that the Iranians said they wouldn't negotiate on their program unless we lifted all sanctions and recognized their right to enrich. We didn't meet those two conditions, but we did raise the pressure. We intensified the sanctions, and they came to the table. I said it's possible, but I don't know if there's going to be an agreement. I think the gaps that exist are real conceptual gaps, but I think if the Iranians understand that the price will remain high, the potential for an agreement is there. Agreements should be of mutual benefit to both sides. Iranians having a peaceful nuclear program can be legitimate, but we have to know, giving their past behavior, that it's a peaceful program and it can't be converted quickly or easily into a weapons program. We have to have a sufficient gap in time to ensure that they don't have breakout capability that we couldn't detect or do something about. There would have to be a very far-reaching transparency on their program. It means their program has to be rolled back in terms of numbers of centrifuges, in terms of shipping out the enriched material they have on hand. They can keep some, but certainly less than one bomb's worth. It needs to be transparent enough that we have the confidence that they're not trying to break out or sneak out. And we need to know what their previous activities were in terms of weaponization — not to punish them, but so we know where to look, and what needs to be verified and checked. Q: You've worked with both Bill and Hillary Clinton. How would you describe Mrs. Clinton in terms of her potential presidential run? Q: You advocate the concept of "smart power" — a combination of diplomacy and military threat. Also, you've said that the Obama Administration has not demonstrated sufficient hard power. Explain. They're very close to each other in terms of attitude, instinct and orientation. They each have a deep commitment to American engagement in the world. President Clinton was a deep believer in What I was calling for was for the U.S. to be competitive. We need to show more consis- tently a readiness to compete. If we do that, we're more likely to affect things the way we'd like to see them.