Opinion

POINT

COUNTERPOINT

Border peace equals regional stability.

Jerusalem/ITA

0

n May 21, the ground shook in
the Middle East as two separate
and significant conflicts sud-
denly and simultaneously headed in the
right direction: toward peace.
Warring Lebanese factions meeting in
Doha, Qatar, reached an agreement after
18 months of great tension, and Israel
and Syria announced the re-launching of
formal peace talks following eight years of
near silence.
Many in the Middle East celebrated the
news even as others looked on with cyni-
cism and distrust. The following morning,
new Israeli polls showed a clear majority
of Israelis opposed to an Israeli withdraw-
al from the Golan Heights, even in return
for peace.
But there is room for optimism.
Rather than addictively clinging to the
hopeless Palestinian track, Israeli leaders

at last are choosing a more
sensible opportunity — one
that has been knocking at
their doorstep for nearly
four years.
Never has another Arab
leader voiced his hope
for peace and the end of
his nation's decades-long
conflict with Israel as has
President Bashar Assad.
Over the past four years or
so, not a month went by
without the Syrian dictator giving public
and private hints, through every possible
channel, calling on Israel for peace.
The gradual return of the Golan Heights
to Syria, under various propositions and
arrangements that have been articulated
in recent years, undoubtedly will bring
the region to a new level of stability. This
stability not only will prompt the rest of
the Arab world to adopt peaceful ties with
Israel almost immediately, but also will

press the Palestinian people to
reach a consensus about their own
claims and demands on Israel.
Peace with Syria could be Israel's
most effective tool against Iran's
belligerency, with a newly created
peaceful atmosphere in the region
triggering renewed efforts to solve
the crisis over Iran's suspected
nuclear weapons program.

At I ssue
What will an Israeli-Syrian peace
agreement entail? First and foremost,
the return to Syria of the entire Golan,
captured by Israel from Syria in the 1967
Six-Day War. But there are many details to
work out.
The two sides will negotiate what
constitutes "entire": Will the border pass
along the shores of Lake Kinneret 33
feet away or be placed 1,300 feet away, as
former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu once proposed?

On the timetable issue, will Israel with-
draw over a period of five years or 15, and
what will happen in the interim period?
Israel and Syria will discuss military
and security issues, including demilitar-
ization, early-warning stations, cross-bor-
der activity; the passage of armaments to
Hezbollah via Syria and more.
Creative solutions will be found on
energy and access to water resources.
Turkey and other third parties already
have offered to cooperate.
No peace agreement between Israel and
Syria can be forged without giving special
attention to the Palestinian issue.
Israel and Syria will discuss the
Palestinian right of return, particularly as
it relates to the 400,000 or so Palestinian
refugees living in Syria. Israel's agreement
with Syria will resolve the political and

At Issue:

Land swap would be a strategic blunder.

Jerusalem/ITA

I

srael and Syria reopened their dip-
lomatic dialogue last month after
a hiatus of eight years. However
encouraging this seems in the violence-
plagued Middle East, the notion that
Israel would have to give Syria the Golan
Heights in exchange for a pledge of peace
is extremely troubling.
Israel captured the Golan in the 1967
Six-Day War following nearly 20 years
in which Syrian forces positioned on the
strategic plateau pounded Israel's farms
and towns below with artillery attacks.
Despite advances in military technol-
ogy, the Golan Heights remains a vital
strategic asset for Israel's defense that
Israel cannot afford to cede.
As negotiators will soon find, there
are three clusters of issues they will not
easily resolve: delineation of an agreed
boundary, security arrangements and the
Syrian-Iranian alliance. To a large extent,
these issues have become even more dif-
ficult since negotiations were held in the
1990s.
• Borders: If Syria argues that it is
entitled to the pre-1967 lines, there is
a fundamental problem because Syria
itself illegally occupied territories dur-

A28

June 5 • 2008

ing the 1950s that were
to Damascus. As during the 1973
within Israel's interna-
Yom Kippur War, when Israeli
tional borders. They are
armor was outnumbered by a
the southern demilitarized
ratio of 8 to 1, this advantage can
zone at al-Hamma, the
enable a small Israeli force to hold
Banias area and the strip
off a large Syrian advance until
of coastal territory along
Israeli reserve forces can arrive.
the northeast shoreline of
It is incorrectly assumed that
the Kinneret. When Syrian
with the proliferation of ballistic
10. -
forces seized the Kinneret
missiles, the holding of actual ter-
Dore
Go Id
shoreline in the 1950s,
ritory is less important today than
Counterp oint
Damascus declared part of
in previous generations. In fact,
the Kinneret as Syrian ter-
should Syria use its considerable
ritorial waters.
rocket and missile forces against Israel to
If Israel were to agree to the June 4,
delay deployment of Israeli reserve forces
1967, line, essentially it would be reward- in the area, the importance of the Golan
ing Syrian aggression from the 1950s as
will increase as Israel's small standing
well as compromising Israeli control of
army will have to fight for more extended
its largest freshwater reservoir. But Syria
periods of time without reserve rein-
is uninterested in anything less.
forcement.
In any case, Israel should not be
As the Second Lebanon War demon-
arguing with the Syrians over whether
strated, air power cannot serve as a sub-
a future Israel-Syria boundary should
stitute for effective land warfare if Israel
correspond to the June 4, 1967, line or to
comes under attack.
the older international border because
• Security arrangements: Some pro-
neither of these lines is defensible.
ponents of a Golan withdrawal cite the
Israel's positions on the Golan now give example of the Israel-Egypt peace accord
its numerically inferior standing army
as a model for Syria. In the agreement
a clear topographical advantage against
with Egypt, Israel was compensated for
the masses of Syrian armor deployed in
its loss of the Sinai Peninsula with "secu-
the plain below that stretch all the way
rity arrangements" that fundamentally

Should

Israel cede the

Golan to Syria

in interest of

peace?

restricted Egyptian forces in the Sinai
through demilitarized areas and limited-
forces zones.
But while the Sinai is roughly 120
miles wide, the Golan ranges from 15 to
just 7 miles wide. In order to create suffi-
cient security for Israel, it is necessary to
institute force limitations on the Syrian
army beyond the Golan Heights, well into
southern Syria.
Given the proximity of Damascus
to the Golan Heights, it is likely that
Israel's security needs for demilitarized
zones will require Syria to pull back its
armored forces behind its own capital.
This indeed was Israel's position during
talks in the 1990s.
This problem is exacerbated by Syria's
massive acquisition of ballistic missiles
and rockets, especially after the 2006
Second Lebanon War.
Israel must seek to place limitations on
these missile forces and on their location