,‘ , .;: 9igirmzep ,e'sr osa M1TIOSAS-411,7e"3011.510? "4".•' :-- . . Opinion Editorials are posted and archived on JNonline.us. Dry Bones PYRAMID THEPALes" SCHEME r YOU WANT TO KIDNAP Editorial DOZENS MORE ISRAELI HOSTAGES? War Lessons E hud Olmert failed as a war prime minister. That much is clear from the Winograd Commission's interim report last month on the Second Lebanon War. Northern Israel is no more secure today than it was a year ago. Hezbollah is just as strong. And Israel's other enemies have new hope that the Israeli military isn't invincible after all. But the importance of the Winograd Commission's findings runs far deeper than one month of mistakes by Israel's Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz and others. The value of the report lies not in assigning blame for 2006, but in pointing to a way forward in 2007 and beyond. Much has been made of the lack of military experience of the men who com- mitted Israel to war last summer. Olmert and Peretz were decades past their limited army service; and Halutz, as an air force officer, showed no understanding of the need to win any war on the ground with infantry and armor. Those men made mistakes that cost lives and that could cost them their careers. Halutz is already retired. Peretz looks likely not only to lose the Labor Party leadership, but also to finish third in voting. Olmert has survived an aborted challenge within his Kadima Party from Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, but we can't be sure Kadima even will survive for more than one more election. Israel needs structural changes that will overcome the flaws of individual leaders, and we like what the Winograd Commission suggests. Going back to a proposal that came out of the Yom Kippur War three decades ago, Israel needs a strong National Security Council, based on the American model, which makes room for the defense and foreign ministers, any other Cabinet min- isters involved in security matters and top military and intelligence professionals. As the Winograd report shows, Israel has a non-functional National Security Council, and that means the prime minister isn't getting the information and advice he needs to make correct decisions during a crisis. Olmert never was told that the Israel Defense Forces had no plan for fighting a war with Hezbollah, despite watching the terrorist group stockpile rockets for six years. And the IDF never knew what the politicians hoped to accomplish in the war, which made planning and executing strat- egy impossible. The current crisis involving Gaza and Kassam rockets is providing the first test ANO WE'LL HAVE THE MANPOWER ONCE THEY TO DO II RELEASE THE HUNDREDS OF CONVICTS of last summer's les- sons. Hamas learned that rocket barrages can damage Israel's self-confidence and unity and can draw Israel into a poorly conceived war. Desperate to halt IN RETURN FOR THE its fighting with HOSTAGE WE'RE ONE Fatah and unify the NOW HOLDING! Palestinians, Hamas wants war. We want a rational response that resolves the impossible living conditions of the resident of Sderot but doesn't deliver a moral or propaganda victory to Israel's enemies. drybonesblog.com Having civilians instead of generals as Israel's top politicians is not the problem. but while waiting for them to emerge, That shift represents a healthy evolution Israel needs its current leaders to listen in Israeli society after nearly 60 years as and learn and set a precedent for healthy a nation. Israel faces far fewer existential internal debate instead of rash decisions threats these days, so the ability to lead in on war. ❑ war isn't the No. 1 quality Israel needs in a prime minister. Send letters of no more than 150 words to: Israel could use a few great statesmen, letters@thejewishnews.com . Reality Check War At The Polls I n the election year summer of 1864, not many people believed that Abraham Lincoln had a chance of winning a second term as president. The war had been dragging on for three years, and for the last two the casu- alty figures were appalling. There were 4,808 dead and 18,573 wounded on both sides in one day at Antietam. At the three days of Gettysburg it was 7,508 dead and 33,264 wounded. Ulysses S. Grant's Virginia campaign was threatening to eclipse even these numbers, and the general was being denounced as a butcher throughout the North. A Confederate force under Jubal Early had come within hours of tak- ing Washington, D.C., that summer and William Sherman was bogged down in a seemingly endless campaign in Georgia. The promise of a negotiated peace held out by the Democratic candidate, former Gen. George McClellan, sounded good. There were, of course, no public opinion polls 143 years ago — but had there been Lincoln's numbers probably would have made George W. Bush look like the homecoming king. I am reading a wonderful new book, Lincoln's Sword, by Douglas L. Wilson. Its subtitle is The Presidency and the Power of Words and it is an examination of Lincoln as a writer. Beyond all his other abilities, he was a superb craftsman of the English language, approached in our history by only Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and, perhaps, Theodore Roosevelt. More than a century after the out- come of that war was settled, it is hard to place ourselves back in a time when it was not at all certain the Union would prevail. Lincoln's ability to define what the great issues were and how they were to be resolved, and to rally the country to his vision, is what set him apart among the great presidents. It is the utter inability of the present administration to articulate any such ideas, except in the most sweeping and imprecise terms, that is as much to blame, along with its failed military policies, for the plunge in support of the Iraq War. To speak of Iraq as a national crisis is absurd. Lincoln faced down the greatest crisis in our history; the possible dissolution of the United States and the prospect that any political minority who didn't like the outcome of an election could secede in the future. Most Americans supported the war in Iraq at its inception, mostly because they thought its planners knew what they were doing. That turned out to be a fallacy. They wanted a war on the cheap and when the price became too steep they had no answer. The military was not set up to fight an urban guerrilla war. While it appears to be changing into that kind of force now, it may well be too late. But even more disturbing to me is the fact that the Democrats have now hitched their hopes for success at the polls in 2008 to accepting failure in Iraq. I think you would have to go back to the 1864 election to find a precedent for that strategy, which has a very high risk of backlash, then and now. The fall of Atlanta in the summer of 1864 and Grant's brutal successes in Virginia turned public opinion around. Now another Memorial Day is approaching, a holiday first conceived as a way to honor the dead of the Civil War. I don't know that conceding defeat hon- ors anyone. 7 George Cantor's e-mail address is gcantor614@aol.com . May 24 9 20(i 33