World
Politics As Usual
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Israelis carry signs calling for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's resignation during a May 3 protest in Tel Aviv.
Oimert beats back political coup, for now, in the wake
of harsh Winograd Commission criticsm.
Leslie Susser
Jewish Telegraphic Agency
Jerusalem
B
y all accounts, Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert should have been
history.
The Winograd Commission's interim
report issued April 30 on the conduct
of last summer's second Lebanon War
could not have been more scathing. The
paragraph on Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert's responsibility for the failures and
shortcomings in top level decision-making
speaks for itself.
"The prime minister," it says, "made up
his mind [to go to war] hastily, despite
the fact that no detailed military plan
was submitted to him and without ask-
ing for one." Further, "His decision was
made without close study of the complex
features of the Lebanon front and of the
military, political and diplomatic options
available to Israel."
And, "He made his decision without
systematic consultation despite not having
experience in foreign and military affairs."
Ostensibly, the damning report should
have been just the stick Foreign Minister
Tzipi Livni needed to unseat Olmert. For
months, Livni had been crafting a move
to take over as Kadima Party boss and
prime minister. Her assumption was that
a critical assessment of Olmert's conduct
of the war, coupled with his close-to-zero
popularity ratings, would force him to step
down. Kadima lawmakers, she thought,
would not tolerate an increasingly
unelectable leader who could cost them
their parliamentary seats.
In the weeks leading up to the report,
Livni's close ally, party Knesset whip
Avigdor Yitzhaki, openly approached
potential Kadima rebels, trying to build a
pro-Livni camp ready to move at the right
time. The influential internal security
minister, Avi Dichter, was supposed to join
at a crucial juncture to create a critical
mass against Olmert.
But there was one thing the would-be
rebels had not counted on: the power of
incumbency. As soon as the Winograd
report was published, Olmert and his
aides used threats and promises to derail
the planned "coup."
Some potential rebels were offered
important new posts that would open
up with a planned government reshuffle;
others were threatened with a premature
end to their political careers. All were
warned that a move against Olmert would
spark new elections Kadima would lose.
Less than 48 hours after the report was
published, Livni's coup attempt had been
stifled.
Still, Olmert remains vulnerable. There
are three ways he could lose his hold
on power: if he fails to keep control of
Kadima, if he loses his Knesset majority
or if mounting public pressure on him to
resign becomes intolerable.
For now, his hold on Kadima seems
secure, but there are rumblings in the
party about replacing him with former
Prime Minister Shimon Peres rather than
Livni. The idea is that Peres would be a
caretaker prime minister until Kadima
chooses a new leader.
That would give some of Livni's rivals
for the top spot — HousingMinister Meir
Sheetrit, Transportation Minister Shaul
Mofaz and Dichter — time to organize
leadership bids.
Olmert, however, is moving swiftly to
head off the Peres push the same way
he quashed Livni's attempt. To keep
his Knesset majority, Olmert has been
strengthening ties with his junior coali-
tion partners and wooing the fervently
Orthodox United Torah Judaism party. He
has developed particularly good relations
with Yisrael Beiteinu's Avigdor Lieberman
and Shas leader Eli Yishai. With them and
the Pensioners' Party, he has a base of 59
seats in the 120-member Knesset and,
together with Labor, a solid majority of 78.
The weak link is Labor, which is under
mounting pressure to pull out over
Winograd. Hence Olmert's effort to bring
in the six-member UTJ faction, which
would leave him with a majority of 65
even if Labor bolts.
To ease public disaffection, Olmert
intends to come out with a new peace
initiative, his confidants acknowledge.
This would coincide with another major
element of his survival strategy: the
establishment of a second Olmert admin-
istration in June, after Labor elects a new
leader. The aim would be to regain public
confidence by appointing strong ministers
to the key defense, finance and foreign
affairs portfolios, and pressing a peace-
making agenda.
Again, the problem with this plan is
Labor. Party secretary Eitan Cabel and
leadership candidates Ophir Pines-Paz,
Politics As Usual on page 24
may 10 •
2007
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