Opinio
OTHER IE S
Seeking Better Answers
M
uch has been written about
U.S. policy regarding Iran
pursuing nuclear weapons but
little, very little, has been said or written
even in the Jewish press about the impli-
cations of a nuclear Iran as it relates to
Israel.
While Iran's nuclear intentions are of
vital interest to the U.S. — and the West,
indeed the world, in general — it is even
more important to Israel. Never since its
creation as a state in 1948 has Israel faced
a greater threat to its existence.
And this is not Jewish paranoia crying
wolf. The threat is real and Israelis are
united on this issue, understanding fully
the potential consequences of a hostile
neighbor with nuclear weapons, one who
already has pledged to "wipe Israel off the
map.
Yet, the Jewish body politic is conduct-
ing business as usual with most of the
emphasis on Israel's conflict with the
Palestinians. While a settlement of that
longstanding conflict would end a long,
bitter and bloody battle, it does not have
the dire implications that a nuclear Iran
poses. The Palestinian problem does not
endanger Israel as a state; a nuclear Iran
does.
All this is captured in a recent article
entitled, "Contra Iran," in The New
Republic, written by Yossi Klein Halevi
and Michael B. Oren and it is appropri-
ately subtitled "Israel's Worst
Nightmare."
And a nightmare it is.
Halevi and Oren begin by
pointing out that the con-
sequences of a nuclear Iran
reached the desk of the late
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
in 1992, but his warnings to
the Clinton administration
fell on deal ears.
They write it was Rabin's
concern about Iran that led
this former hardliner to try
and negotiate with the Palestinians and
make peace with the Arabs to prevent a
nuclear Iran.
His strategy did not work; Iran is pro-
ceeding with its nuclear plans, snubbing
its defiant nose at the world. While predic-
tions on when Iran will have a nuclear
bomb vary, most estimates fall into a
three-to-seven year period.
This scenario, write Halevi and Klein,
has led official Israel to discuss what it
calls a "second Holocaust" and the analogy
is not just political hype. The left and right
seem to be united on this point and all
appear to agree that Israel will not be able
to count on help from the rest of the world,
particularly in an environment in which
anti-Semitism is continually increasing.
They quote the Deputy Defense Minister
Ephraim Sneh, who worked for Rabin, as
stating that Iran would not even
have to drop the bomb. Just its
possession by Iran would have
terrible consequences, such as:
•Arab nations would fear
making any accommodations
with Israel, worrying that they
may become a target of Iran.
• With a nuclear weapon, Iran
can bolster non-compromis-
ing enemies of Israel, such as
Hamas and Hezbollah, with more
sophisticated weapons..
• Foreign investors would
leave the country, as would many Israelis.
According to public opinion polls, 27 per-
cent of Israelis said they would emigrate
from Israel when — I am not using "if"
— Iran goes nuclear.
Halevi and Klein discuss many other
aspects of a nuclear Iran but the major
point is that it's time to put this item at
the top of the Jewish political agenda.
All other issues pale in comparison to
the potential of Iran having the ultimate
weapon.
I have stated in speeches and wrote
many years ago that I believed the first
nuclear war would involve Israel, conclud-
ing that at some future date Israel would
find itself with its back against the wall
and would have to use a nuclear weapon.
I was always considered the ultimate pes-
simist. Unfortunately, I turned out to be a
realist.
Regrettably, the unthinkable, horrific
scenario is almost a reality.
But, say more optimistic futurists, if
Iran drops a bomb on Israel, the Jewish
state will retaliate, destroying Tehran and
maybe even more of Iran. Or, they say,
Israel will launch a preemptive nuclear
strike.
Somehow that just does not make one
feel any better. I hope as a people and in
the interest of humanity as a whole we
work to find better answers.
The first step to a nuclear Holocaust is
for the human mind to accept its inevi-
tability and that it is an acceptable tactic
despite its unimaginable consequences.
And that has happened.
In responding to the question whether
Iran would be willing to sacrifice millions
of its citizens in exchange for destroy-
ing Israel, Iran's former president, Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani who, as Bret Stephens
points out in Commentary, was consid-
ered a moderate, responded:
... It is not irrational to contemplate
such an eventuality"
If that is not "irrational," then the word
"irrational" has lost all its meaning. 7
CC
A former political reporter, Berl Falbaum, an
author and Farmington Hills public relations
executive, teaches journalism part time at
Wayne State University in Detroit.
Correcting Carter
Second in a series
A
t issue: United Nations
Resolution 242 (November
1967) is inaccurately stated
in Jimmy Carter's new book, Palestine:
Peace not Apartheid. The resolution, which
advanced the idea of land for peace, is the
backbone of all Arab-Israeli negotiations
— the 1978 Camp David Accords, the 1979
Egyptian-Israeli
treaty, the 1993
Palestinian-Israeli
Oslo Accords and
the 1994 Jordanian-
Israeli treaty.
The writers of
the
resolution took
PEACE NOT
five
months of labo-
A ['A RTH E I D
rious
negotiation to
l imm cm: ap.
choose every word.
The ambiguity of
the document remains its strongest fea-
ture, since the authors sought approval by
the two superpowers, the United States and
32
February 22 • 2007
Ai
the Soviet Union, each with its
is a violation of Resolution 242.
own interests to safeguard.
Furthermore, according to
The text calls for the "applica-
the altered text, one can assume
tion of ... withdrawal of Israel
that coercion or pressure could
armed forces from territories
or should be applied to Israel
occupied in the recent conflict:'
until she consents to a with-
It does not call for some, all or
drawal. Taking this logic fur-
total withdrawal, and it does
ther, why would any Arab party
not insist that withdrawal take
negotiate with Israel if she will
place from all the territories
be forced to withdraw anyway?
occupied in the June 1967 war.
Kenneth W.
Moreover, and this is most
Furthermore, the word must
Stein
significant, the concept of
does not appear in the resolution.
Special
must/coercion undermines the
What Carter says: The "cen-
Commentary
core concept of "negotiations
tral premise" of Resolution 242 is
between the parties." Omitted
that "Israel must withdraw from
in Resolution 242, "negotia-
occupied territories" (pages 38 to 39, italics tions between the parties" was inserted
added).
into U.N. Resolution 338, the cease-fire
Implications of Carter's views:
resolution passed at the end of the October
Carter's use of "must" connotes obligation,
1973 Arab-Israeli war. Without negotia-
a demand for action that does not exist
tions between the parties, Arab parties can
in the resolution. Using the logic implicit
refuse to recognize Israel's legitimacy by
in this new, altered text, the fact that
having a third party, the United Nations or
Israel has not withdrawn from the Golan
some other body, such as an international
Heights, east Jerusalem and the West Bank conference, impose withdrawal on Israel or
impose sanctions on Israel until she with-
draws to the pre-June-1967-war lines.
By mandating Israeli withdrawal, Carter
gives hope to those organizations like
Hamas and others that are verbally and
actively committed to Israel's demise to
avoid direct negotiations and buy time
until the international community cuts
Israel's size to the pre-1967 lines.
And by raising the expectations of
must/coercion, Carter is turning the clock
back to the 1970s and 1980s, when the
PLO and other Arab states insisted that
the international community force Israeli
withdrawal from all the territories before
negotiations.
Instead of advancing negotiations
between the parties, Carter is working
against them: If you do nothing, the inter-
national community will do it for you. By
extension, if withdrawal to pre-1967 lines
is a precondition for negotiations, and not
necessarily between the parties, what must
Israel then give up in its negotiations for
peace if the starting point is the pre-1967