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June 11, 2004 - Image 28

Resource type:
Text
Publication:
The Detroit Jewish News, 2004-06-11

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Reagan's Mixed Jewish Legacy

Washington
onald Reagan, who died last
week at the age of 93, left a
legacy of strengthened U.S —
Israel strategic ties and a new comfort
level between official Washington and
the Jewish state.
But paradoxically, his administration
also elevated to prominence some offi-
cials with a strong anti-Israel bent and
featured memorable battles with Israel's
supporters here, including the landmark
1981 fight over the sale of AWACS air-
craft to Saudi Arabia.
On the domestic front, the conserva-
tive Reagan Revolution clashed with the
political sensibilities of most American
Jews. But Reagan's eloquence and opti-
mism also inspired a core of Jewish neo-
conservatives to abandon the Demo-
cratic Party; some are now playing criti-
cal roles in the Bush administration's for-
eign policy.
Reagan's presidency was a study in
contradictions: great sensitivity to Jewish
concerns clashing with moments of dis-
turbing insensitivity; unprecedented sup-
port for U.S.-Israel ties, but also a will-
ingness to put the presidential squeeze
on Israeli leaders; a remarkable comfort
level with Jews, but also an administra-
don with little Jewish involvement at the
highest levels.
On Israel, Reagan will be remembered
for a monumental shift in U.S. policy,
although he was not the author of it.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, Israel
was increasingly seen as a vital strategic
ally of the United States. That process,
which began under the administration of
President Jimmy Carter as a way of
nudging Israel along the road to peace,
took a quantum leap in 1981 when

R

James D. Besser is Washington corre-
spondent for the Detroit Jewish News.
His e-mail address is jbesser@att.net

Reagan signed a landmark memoran-
dum of understandinc, formalizing the
military relationship with Israel. In
1987, Israel was designated a major non-
NATO ally, another step up the strategic
cooperation ladder.
To Reagan, Israel was a vital partner in
the fight against the "evil empire" of the
Soviet Union, not a moral burden. The
mechanisms of cooperation Reagan
instituted became the foundation of a
strategic relationship that continues to
expand and continues to insulate U.S.-
Israel relations from political ups and
downs.
But Reagan was also willing to play
hardball with Israel when its policies
clashed with his own. During his 1980
campaign, he expressed opposition to
the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia, ini-
tiated by the Carter administration and
opposed by the government of Israeli
Prime Minister Menachem Begin and
the American Jewish leadership.
But after his inauguration, he
approved the sale, touching off a fierce
clash that resulted in administration offi-
cials going to Capitol Hill and demand-
ing that lawmakers make a choice:
Reagan or Begin, a phrase that quickly
turned up on anti-Israel bumper stickers.
After bitter skirmishes and some presi-
dential chastising of the Israeli leader for
interfering in internal American politics,
the sale was approved by a narrow mar-
gin.
But the lessons learned in that fight
revolutionized pro-Israel lobbying, set-
ting the stage for an era when support
for Israel would be virtually wall to wall
on Capitol Hill — a backhanded
accomplishment of The Gipper.
Today, pro-Israel forces react with out-
rage if a president uses public statements
to pressure the Israeli government. But
Reagan was willing to use tactics
stronger than mere words.

The Prisoner's Conscience

I

Jerusalem
n 1983, I was confined to an 8x10-
foot prison cell on the border of
Siberia. My Soviet jailers gave me
the privilege of reading the latest copy of
Pravda. Splashed across the front page
was a condemnation of President Ronald
Reagan for having the temerity to call
the Soviet Union an "evil empire.”
Tapping on walls and talking through
toilets, word of Reagan's "provocation"
quickly spread throughout he prison. We
dissidents were ecstatic. Finally, the
leader of the free world had spoken the

„IN

6/11
2004

28

Natan Sharansky; a prisoner of Zion
for nine years, is currently Israel's minis-
ter-without por t folio in charge of
Jerusalem and di aspora affairs. This is a
condensed version of a longer Jerusalem
Post column that ran on June 7.

truth — a truth that burned inside the
heart of each and every one of us.
At the time, I never imagined that
three years later, I would be in the White
House telling this story to the president.
When he summoned some of his staff to
hear what I had said, I understood that
there had been much criticism of
Reagan's decision to cast the struggle
between the superpowers as a battle
between good and evil.
Well, Reagan was right and his critics
were wrong.
Those same critics used to love calling
Reagan a simpleton who saw the world
through a primitive ideological prism
and who would convey his ideas through
jokes and anecdotes. What his critics
didn't seem to understand was that the
jokes and anecdotes that so endeared

But his administration was
In 1981, he held up delivery
also willing to trade arms to one
of F-16 aircraft in response to
of Israel's harshest enemies,
Israel's bombing of Iraq's nuclear
Iran, to boost his crusade
reactor; in 1982, he threatened
against the Nicaraguan Contras.
to cut Israel's foreign aid because
Reagan's influence extended
of its reluctance to embrace a
into Jewish politics at a time of
"Reagan plan" for the region
great ferment.
later rejected by the Arabs.
The 1970s saw the rise of
But Reagan also selected as his
JAM ES D.
"Scoop
Jackson Democrats,"
second Secretary of State a man
BES SER
activists who were uncomfort-
venerated for his support for
Sp e cial
Israel's security needs and his
Comm entary able with the leftward tilt of
the party, especially on for-
active role in reviving Israel's
eign policy.
economy — George Shultz.
Reagan's strong stance on defense and
In fact, Reagan's official family was as
his charisma drew many into the
contradictory as the man himself
Republican fold where some went on to
Besides traditional conservatives like
play a role in both Bush administrations.
Shultz, he brought into the administra-
But Reagan promoted domestic poli-
tion many strongly pro-Israel neo-con-
cies that were still anathema to large
servatives who helped shape the emerg-
numbers of Jews, and he gave a huge
ing strategic relationship.
boost to a group that was emerging as a
But there was also Defense Secretary
major adversary to liberal Jewish organi-
Caspar Weinberger and Chief of Staff
zations: the religious right.
James Baker 111— both remembered as
Reagan helped forge a working
unfriendly to the Jewish state.
alliance between the traditional econom-
For two years, his communications
ic conservatives, who focused mostly on
director was Pat Buchanan, who played a
reducing government and cutting taxes,
role in one of Reagan's most jarring
and the "social" conservatives, driven by
clashes with the Jewish community —
issues such as abortion and homosexuali-
his 1985 decision to visit a military
cemetery at Bitburg, West Germany.
ty.
That alliance is the political engine
Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel implored
behind the current GOP dominance of
the president to abandon the visit when
Congress and the White House.
it was learned that Waffen SS troops
Reagan helped open the door to the
were buried there.
Republican Party — but Jews moved
But the administration was more
through it in a steady trickle, not a stam-
interested in giving a political boost to
pede. Because of Reagan, many Jews felt
Chancellor Helmut Kohl than in easing
more comfortable voting for individual
Jewish concerns and the visit took place,
Republican candidates, and GOP parti-
leaving a lingering stain on Reagan's
san identification by Jews increased sig-
Jewish legacy.
nificantly, although it still lags far behind
Reagan's role as the president who
the Democratic numbers.
faced down the Soviets and caused the
But some of the forces unleashed by
unraveling of their empire will be debat-
Reagan, starting with the Christian right,
ed by generations of historians.
continue to be an offsetting factor —
What is less open to debate is the fact
keeping some Jewish voters away from
that his tough Cold War tactics helped
the party of a former president they
Israel by defanging its most implacable
admired. ❑
enemies and redefining its relationship
with Washington.

with my wife Avital, who had
Reagan to people were merely his
fought for many years for my
way of expressing fundamental
release, I quickly asked him
truths in a way that everyone
about the rally, outlining the
could understand.
, concerns raised by some of my
Reagan's tendency to confuse
colleagues. His response was
names and dates, something I,
immediate: "Do you think I
too, experienced firsthand, also
NATAN
am interested in a friendship
made him the target of ridicule.
SHARANSKY with the Soviets if they contin-
In September 1987, a few
ue to keep their people in
Special
months before a summit meeting
with Gorbachev in Washington,
Commentary prison? You do what you
believe is right."
I met with Reagan to ask him
The legacy of President Reagan will
what he thought about the idea of hold-
surely endure. Armed with moral clarity,
ing a massive rally of hundreds of thou-
sands of people on behalf of Soviet Jewry a deep faith in freedom, and the courage
to follow his convictions, he was instru-
during the summit. Some Jewish leaders,
mental in helping the West win the Cold
concerned that if the rally were held Jews
War and hundreds of millions of people
would be accused of undermining a
behind the Iron Curtain win their free-
renewed hope for peace between the
dom.
superpowers, had expressed reservations
As one of those people, I can only
about such a frontal challenge to the
express my deepest gratitude to this great
Soviet premier.
leader. ❑
Seeing me together for the first time

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