Analysis

The Peace Debate

Details emerge of "Geneva Accord," renewing the partisan battle in Israel.

LESLIE SUSSER

Jewish Telegraphic Agency

Jerusalem

fter three years in the politi-
cal wilderness, the Israeli
left has something to cheer
about:
The so-called "Geneva Accord,"
negotiated by a group of Israeli doves
and Palestinian moderates, has revived
dormant hopes of a peace agreement
with the Palestinians and given the
left a shot in the arm. Right-wing and
centrist critics insist that the Geneva
negotiators have done more harm
than good.
At the least, what the group of
doves led by former cabinet minister
Yossi Beilin has done is to set the
parameters of debate in Israel on the
terms of a final peace agreement with
the Palestinians.
With the U.S.-backed road map
peace plan in tatters and Palestinian
Authority Prime Minister Ahmed
Queri locked in a power struggle with
P.A. Pres-ident Yasser Arafat, Beilin
led a team that met with Palestinian
figures to work out a prospective
peace deal that entails far deeper
Israeli concessions than any previous
plan.
The Palestinian negotiators are close
to Arafat and reportedly have his
backing. None of the Israelis involved
in the talks holds public office; many
were associated with the government
of Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who
was trounced at the polls in February
2001 following peace offers that many
Israelis considered too generous. None
has authority to negotiate in Israel's
name.
But that hasn't stopped the plan
from garnering major attention in
Israel and in Europe. Opening the
Knesset's winter session on Oct. 20,
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
rejected the agreement as an "illusion"
that would encourage the Palestinians
to go back on their commitment
under the road map to fight terror-
ism.
The Geneva initiative differs from
the road map by making a giant leap
to a final peace deal while terrorism
continues unabated. In contrast, the
road map insists on step-by-step ful-
fillment of numerous obligations —

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2003

26

especially an end to ter-
rorism — before perma-
nent status issues are dis-
cussed.
Still, there is a potential
meeting point between
the two plans. If the road
map's two interim phases
are implemented and a
mini-Palestinian state has
been established, the
Gene-va initiative could
then provide a model for a
final deal. However, even
if the Sharon government
does get past phase II of
the road map, it's unlikely
to endorse the far-reaching
concessions called for in
the Geneva Accord.

Beilin

Fierce Criticism

The Palestinians might
have other ideas, though,
and critics say that's the
most invidious aspect of
the proposal: In any future Barak
official negotiations, they
argue, the unauthorized
Geneva "concessions" will
serve as a starting point for
new Palestinian demands.
Among the fiercest crit-
ics has been Barak, who
derided the proposal as
"delusional" and said it
lacks key elements upon
which Israel must insist:
There is no explicit
Palestinian waiver of the
demand that refugees be
Mitzna
granted a "right of return" to
homes they fled during Israel's 1948
War of Independence, nor is there
explicit recognition of Israel's right to
exist as a Jewish state.
Unofficial versions of the text bear
Barak out. They also suggest that
Beilin's group has gone much further
than Barak did on the key issues of
territory, Jerusalem and refugees at the
Camp David summit in July 2000 or
at follow-up negotiations held in
Taba, Egypt, in January 2001.
• On territory, the Palestinians
would get the Gaza Strip and 98 per-
cent of the West Bank — including
the city of Ariel, which they did not
get at Taba — plus Israeli land near

Gaza to make up for the
rest.
• On Jerusalem, the
agreement would give the
Palestinians administrative
control of the Temple
Mount, with a multina-
tional force guaranteeing
free movement and securi-
ty on the ground. Israel
would get sovereignty over
the Western Wall and the
Jewish cemetery on the
Mount of Olives.
• As at Taba, Jewish
neighborhoods of
Jerusalem would consti-
tute Israel's capital, while
Arab and other non-
Jewish neighborhoods of
the city would become the
capital of Palestine.
The biggest stumbling
block in previous negotia-
tions was the refugee
issue. In the Geneva
Accord, the Palestinians
refused to waive their
demand for a right of
return, a key element in
their historical narrative of
dispossession. Israel fears
that such a right would
delegitimize the Jewish
state and — if it leads to a
flood of refugees into
Israel — effectively spell
its end.
The Geneva text refers
to U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 194, U.N.
Security Council
Resolution 242 and the
2001 Saudi peace initiative — which,
some analysts say, is tantamount to
bringing in the right of return
through the back door. The agree-
ment would allow each refugee to
choose between five options, includ-
ing settling in Israel.
Though Israel could limit its intake
of refugees, the agreement says that
Israel "will take into account the aver-
age number taken in by the third
countries." That means Israel could
find itself pressed to take in tens of
thousands of refugees by the interna-
tional committee that the agreement
envisions processing applications.
Critics say the Israeli negotiators

were so intent on clinching a deal to
boost their political fortunes that they
gave away far too much. They also
accuse Beilin's group of subverting
democratic processes by arrogating a
role reserved for the elected govern-
ment.

Turning Up Debate

The doves counter that the agreement
fills a political vacuum caused by the
government's failure to initiate far-
reaching peace moves. Moreover, they
say, it shows that there indeed is
someone to talk to on the Palestinian
side.
Former Labor Parry leader Amram
Mitzna, one of the negotiators, calls
the initiative "a historic turning
point" that enables Israeli and
Palestinian leaders "to understand
exactly what each side is ready to give
up.''
At the least, the issues raised by the
accord are sure to become central in
Israel's domestic debate in the weeks
and months ahead. But the key to its
fate depends on whether the interna-
tional community adopts the accord
and tries to impose it on the parties
— and that remains unlikely.
European countries like Switzerland
and Britain gave the negotiators logis-
tic support and encouraged their
work, but it's the United States that
calls the shots — and, for now,
Washington remains committed to
the road map. Without support from
Washington, the initiative is unlikely
to have operative significance.
The Geneva Accord is not the only
grass-roots initiative to try to break
the current deadlock. A one-page plan
finalized several months ago by Ami
Ayalon, former head of Israel's Shin
Bet security service, and Sari
Nusseibeh, formerly the P.A.'s top
Jerusalem official, has similar parame-
ters.
Ayalon and Nusseibeh have gath-
ered signatures supporting the docu-
ment — 90,000 Israelis and 60,000
Palestinians, they claim — but say
they are waiting for more before tak-
ing it to Palestinian and Israeli lead-
ers.
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh formula dif-
fers from the Geneva Accord in two
fundamental ways: It is only a set of