OTHER VIEWS
The Meaning Of Cease-Fire
Jerusalem
ne of the most significant
obstacles to be overcome in
the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process is language. The cul-
tural, conceptual and language barriers
that separate the negotiating partners
are greater than their negotiation over
land and far more difficult to resolve.
The language of negotiations may be
English, but each partner in the process
thinks in his mother tongue, translates
for his citizens in his mother tongue and
consciously and subconsciously negoti-
ates through his own cultural bias.
Israelis and, even more so, the
United States, have little to no idea of
what really goes on in the minds of
Palestinians and the rest of the Arab
world. Concepts and language in the
Arab world are drastically different
than they are in the Western world.
The best example of this is found in
the use of the word "cease-fire," a con-
cept central to the pursuit of this
peace. Each party uses the word, but
Micah D. Halpern is a Middle East
analyst and an expert on terrorism. His e-
mail address is JcommMicah@aol.com
0
for each it holds different meaning
and cultural connotation.
In English, as understood by the
United States, the term "cease-fire"
means a total end of any act by one
party that may be understood as
aggressive toward the second party.
In Hebrew, the term is translated to
mean hafiakat aish. For Israelis, the
cease-fire means that Palestinians must
stop all attacks against them, but if
Israel has intelligence of a pending ter-
ror attack against them, they can and
will act to prevent it.
In Arabic, the term used for cease-
fire is hudna; for Palestinians, it means
a temporary ceasing of hostility and
scaling down of hostilities against a
true enemy until one can attack again.
These differences are enough to tor-
pedo any agreement after it is signed.
In Arabic, there are three kinds of
peace pacts: hudna, attwah and sulha.
They have their roots in tribal law
from the Arab world.
The hudna is a fundamental princi-
ple recognized by every Arab for its role
in history as well as in politics. It is a
legal concept applied in both intra- and
inter- tribal grievances. It is a tempo-
cultural implications. In Arab
rary stage.
history (including Arabs who
The hudna is used as a vehi-
live in Israel), the 1949
cle to achieve the next stage,
Armistice Agreements, signed in
attwah, a non-time-bound or
Rhodes between Israel and her
.long-term cease-fire. A final
Arab neighbors, is considered a
peace settlement is not reached
period of hudna. In English, the
until the next, final stage of
treaty was called an armistice
peace, the sulha.
MICAH
and in Hebrew, hafiakat aish.
The most famous hudna took
In September 1993,
HALPERN
place in 628 when the prophet
Special
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat,
Muhammad entered into a
Commentary Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak
peace pact with the elders of
Rabin and President Bill
Medina in the town of Hud ay
Clinton signed the Oslo accords on the
Biyyah. The truce was to last for nine
White House lawn. This was seen as a
years, nine months and nine days. Two
major step forward for peace. One
years later, Muhammad violated the
month later, in Cape Town, South
treaty and attacked — defeating the
Africa, Yasser Arafat called the Oslo
tribal leaders.
This story from the Koran teaches fol- treaty, a pact of Hud ay Biyyah. All
those who heard his words knew the
lowers of Islam two important lessons.
significance of this hudna — it was a
That one can make a treaty with nonbe-
treaty made in order to be broken at an
lievers when you are weak and it is in
appropriate time.
your best interest. That after you have
Cease-fire. The word is, once again,
revitalized your strength, you may break
central to peace negotiations between
the treaty. It is the koranic or Muslim
Palestinians and Israelis. If history has
version of a Trojan Horse — the gesture
taught the negotiating parties any-
or the gift becomes the catalyst for
thing, it is that cease-fire is much
defeat.
more than a word. 0
Other examples can help clarify these
terms, their historical validity and their
Lessons From History
Philadelphia
smattering of knowledge of
the past seems to be
enough to send politicians
and journalists off on tan-
gled tangents that serve their purpos-
es but usually mangle history. And,
as is often the case, it is the Middle
East that is more likely than any
other topic to serve as the field for
such misguided historical lectures.
Perhaps the most popular story
circulating among the chattering
classes as a historical lesson to be fol-
lowed is that of Israel's Altalena inci-
dent, which was, to take but one
recent example, the subject of a New
York Times May 30 editorial by
Ethan Bronner.
Titled "What Palestinians Can
Learn From a Turning Point in
Zionist History," the piece purport-
ed to show that the key for Middle
East peace was the willingness of the
new Palestinian prime minister,
111
6/13
2003
22
Jonathan S. Tobin is executive
editor of the Jewish Exponent in
Philadelphia. His e-mail address
is jtobin@jewishexponent.com
Mahmoud Abbas, to turn his guns
on Hamas the way David Ben-
Gurion did on his own rivals in
1948.
The Altalena was a ship bearing
arms and volunteers to fight in
Israel's War of Independence that
had been brought to the newly born
State of Israel by the Irgun Zvai
Leumi, the guerilla force led by
Menachem Begin that had helped
chase the British out of the country.
As Bronner tells it, Ben-Gurion's
decision to order the Haganah to fire
on the ship and kill their fellow Jews
solidified Israel's fledgling democra-
cy.
The Times wants Abbas to do the
same thing with his rivals. That's an
excellent suggestion, but the analogy
Bronner makes between the Irgun
and Hamas is as wrongheaded as his
acceptance of Ben-Gurion's self-serv-
ing narrative of one of the most
shocking and tragic incidents in
modern Jewish history.
Contrary to the Times, the Irgun
and the Lechi (known pejoratively in
English-language histories as the
Stern gang) attacked only military
since that Begin was plotting
his violent overthrow had
more to do with the need of
Israel's first prime minister
to discredit a potential foe
' than anything else.
Ben-GuriOn's Role
The true hero of the story
was actually Begin, who sin-
Moreover, had Bronner
researched the issue further,
JONATHAN gle-handedly averted a
Jewish civil war by ordering
he would have learned a
S. TOBIN
Irgunists not to retaliate. He
more complicated story. The
Special
only real difference between
Commentary had done the same thing in
1944 when Ben-Gurion had
Ben-Gurion and Begin at the
the Haganah turn Begin's
time was that the latter was
men over to the British.
hoping to prod the prime minister
It would be a good thing if the
to re-take the Old City of Jerusalem,
Palestinian Authority actually decid-
whose Jewish Quarter had just been
ed to round up their terrorists.
sacked by Arab forces.
But the difference between 1948
The Irgun was still operating sepa-
and 2003 is that the Jews didn't need
rately from the Haganah only in
a civil war to achieve a democracy or
Jerusalem. And that was only
to make peace with an Arab world
because the Israeli government want-
that wanted only to kill them. The
ed to maintain the fiction that it was
Palestinians do need to fight a war
not claiming Israel's capital, which
among themselves in order to have a
was supposed to be under interna-
government that will be democratic
tional control under the United
and to make peace with the Jewish
Nations partition plan.
state.
Ben-Gurion's motives for firing his
))
But then again, Bronner also
sacred canon were complicated,
but the notion put forward then and TOBIN on page 24
targets and have nothing in
common with Palestinians
who deliberately seek to kill
civilians.
"