V M ki • :s• , e , Cease-Fire Call Possible Palestinian cease-fire bid poses a strategic dilemma for Israel. LESLIE SUSSER Jewish Telegraphic Agency Jerusalem I In Israel, the different views of the Palestinian plan that was emerging derive, at least partly, from different analyses of the Palestinians' motives. According to one account, there has been a major change in Palestinian thinking. Young members of the Tanzim, the militia of Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement, recognize that the intifada is getting them nowhere and want a cease-fire to build a new relationship with Israel and the United States. The economic hardship caused by Israel's reoccupation of Palestinian cities a month ago has made this need even more urgent. A cease-fire might encourage release of Palestinian tax money Israel is holding — after the Gaza debacle, Sharon transferred some $15 million of the money July 31 — and addi- tional aid from the United States and other quarters would help rebuild life in the Palestinian territories. sraeli politicians are divided over whether a cease-fire proposal that the Palestinians reportedly were about to present last week was genuine. The July 23 assassination of Hamas' military leader, a bombing that also killed 14 civil- ians, temporarily shelved the plan. The impetus behind the proposal remains the same, however, raising the likelihood that — with some prodding from the interna- tional community — the Palestinians indeed may soon put a plan on the table. According to reports, despite the killing of Hamas military leader Salah Shehada, talks are still under way among various Palestinian fac- tions to work out such a plan. Some Israeli officials believe it would show that Israeli steadfastness against the intifada (uprising) has pushed the Palestinians to the point of finally needing negotiations. That would present Israeli leaders with a difficult dilemma: Should they keep up military pressure to finally crush the intifada? Or should they respond to a cease-fire plan, even one about which they have reservations, with concessions of their own? Israeli officials continue to regar with skepticism reports of Palestinian readiness for a cease- fire. The suicide bombing July 27 in Jerusalem and terrorist explosion on July 28 at Hebrew University did not help the situation. What is needed, Israeli leaders say, is not a truce that leaves Harnas, Tanzim and other terrorist Palestinians in the Gaza Strip inspect the damage the day after Israel's July groups and militias intact to fight Left-wing Israelis, like the Labor Party's Haim another day, but reform of Palestinian institutions to Ramon, the new chairman of the Knesset's Foreign concentrate all military power in one body and dis- Affairs and Defense Committee, say that if this is the mantle any competing power centers. thinking behind the cease-fire drive, it constitutes the But, after the July 23 raid in Gaza City, which beginning of a strategic change and is of vital impor- killed Shehada and at least 14 civilians, Israeli lead- tance. Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti, who is in ers might find their freedom of action limited. an Israeli jail awaiting trial, is said to think this way. Coming just as reports were emerging of an immi- Others offer more tactical explanations for the nent Palestinian cease-fire plan, the Gaza attack cease-fire effort. According to a rival theory, Tanzim opened Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to activists feel threatened by the moves to reform charges that he was torpedoing progress toward Palestinian military . and political institutions. The peace — and might make it more difficult for his activists fear they might be sidelined as Arafat's government to dismiss a new Palestinian plan cronies control the reform process and use it to backed by European negotiators. shore up the old guard's strength. The stature of the Tanzim fighters has grown Leslie Susser is the diplomatic correspondent for the immensely in Palestinian society during nearly two years Jerusalem Report. AN JILTS'S 8/ 2 2002 18 of warfare with Israel. Yet they realize that their power has no political outlet, and what they are trying to do through the cease-fire bid, according to this theory, is to place their movement at the center of the Palestinian political map, dictating a timetable and an agenda and stealing the initiative from Arafat and Hamas. According to this theory, the Tanzim activists want a cease-fire to create a climate for elections. Their plan is to push first for internal Fatah elections, in which they can take control of the movement's insti- tutions and establish a power base for municipal and national elections that would follow. The cease-fire bid, then, is part of an internal Palestinian power struggle, a tactical move that might not change attitudes toward Israel, even if the young Tanzim activists win a greater measure of power. As for Hamas, the theory goes, they want a cease-fire to pre-empt attempts to disband their military wing as part of the reform of the Palestinian armed services. • The idea was for the Tanzim to publish a unilateral cease-fire declaration in various Western newspapers, in the Arabic press and in a Hebrew daily. Mark Perry, an American lobbyist for the Palestinians, helped draft the English text. As the initiative gained momentum, Mohammad Dahlan, the former head of Palestinian security in the Gaza Strip and one of Arafat's potential successors, was brought in. Arafat's top aides were left out. Hamas leaders were approached and, accord- ing to reports, at least some indicated that they would be ready to go along. However, according to Israeli intelli- gence, Arafat found out what was going on and made it clear that he had no interest in a cease-fire at this juncture. The activists on the ground got the message, and Israeli defense and intelli- gence officials insist that the terrorist rank-and-file would not have respected the cease-fire that the political leaders had negotiated in their names. At the July 26 meeting of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Ramon produced a ver- sion of the Palestiniaricease-fire docu- ment and asked Defense Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer whether he had known about it before Shehada was 1 ( ill e d 23 airstrike. Ben-Eliezer said he had, but played down its significance. He described it as an initiative by the leaders of the organizations and not the grassroots terrorists who, he said, would have ignored it. And, Ben-Eliezer added, so would Shehada himself, who at the time of his assassination was planning acts of mega-terror, including a one- ton truck bomb, and simultaneous bombings in six different Israeli cities. Ben-Eliezer made the official Israeli position clear: A genuine cease-fire would be welcomed, but not at the expense of reform of the Palestinian security services. He is convinced that the most effective guarantee of long-term peace and quiet is a single armed Palestinian force, in total control of Palestinian territory, and cooperating with the Israel Defense Forces on security matters. ❑