OTHER VIEWS

A Sharon-Led Israel

IV

hat does the election of
Ariel Sharon as prime
minister — Israel's fifth
in just six years — mean
for Israel, for its relations with its
neighbors and with the United States,
and for us?
First, let's begin by reviewing the
basic facts of the election. Sharon
swept to victory by a 3-2 margin over
incumbent Prime Minister Ehud
Barak. This was by far the largest mar-
gin of victory since Israelis began vot-
ing directly for prime minister in
1996.
Voter turnout was very light, espe-
cially by Israeli standards. Whereas in
America-we're accustomed to 50 to 60
percent turnout, in Israel 80 percent
turnout is the norm. Two weeks ago,
only about 60 percent of the Israeli
electorate voted.
Barak led Sharon in the Tel Aviv
and Haifa areas, but was defeated
handily in most other regions of Israel,
especially in Jerusalem and its envi-
rons. Clearly, people living in areas
that have been more vulnerable to the
current violent conflict with the Pales-
tinians were more likely to vote for

David Gad-Had is executive director
of the Jewish Community Council of
Metropolitan Detroit.

Sharon.
What can we
learn from the
outcome of the
Israeli election?
Once again, the
mood of the
Israeli electorate
has taken a dra-
matic shift, much
DAVID
as it did in 1996
GAD-HARF
when it turned
Community
Shimon Peres out
Views
of the prime
minister's office
and in 1999
when Binyamin Netanyahu was
defeated. This represents the "yin-
yang" of Israeli politics: When the
public is in the mood for peace nego-
tiations, it tends to favor the Labor
Party; when violence and terrorism
make the public yearn for security, it
gives its support to Likud.

In Synch With Bush

As to his government's role in a
peace process with the Palestinians,
Sharon will not aim in the short
term for a comprehensive peace
agreement. Rather, he will pursue a
step-by-step approach that begins
with a cessation of violence. In any
resumption of discussions, he will
set aside the concessions made by

the Barak government during the
past several months.
A Sharon-led government may, in
fact, be more in sync with the Bush
administration's international outlook,
and I anticipate a continuing strong
relationship between governments. As
Secretary of State Colin Powell travels
to the Middle East for consultations
with its leaders, he will be focusing on
America's broader, regional concerns.
Under Sharon's leadership, Israel,
too, will likely turn its attention
toward the dangers lurking in the
Mideast region, including the threats
emanating from Iran and Iraq. Sharon
may also launch discussions with
Syria's new leader toward a peace
agreement.
The election of Sharon is just what
Palestinian extremists wanted. They
have portrayed him as a warmonger
and will now use his election as a
weapon to gain additional power
within the Palestinian community.
The Palestinian Authority will be
under intense pressure to take a hard
line against Israel. It will be very diffi-
cult for PA leader Yasser Arafat or any
successor to speak and act with
authority, to quell the violence and re-
enter talks with Israel.
How will the election affect our
role as advocates for Israel?
Even with the ups and downs of

the peace process, the past seven
years of negotiations have made it
much easier for American Jewish
organizations to advocate for Israel
and for strong U.S.-Israel ties. After
more than four months of Palestin-
ian violence and the election of a
more hawkish prime minister, the
situation today is more like what we
faced in the 1980s, when Menachem
Begin and Yitzhak Shamir led Israeli
governments.
We will have to contend with a
backdrop of continued, if not intensi-
fied, violence by the Palestinians and
perhaps along the border with
Lebanon, a more hostile Arab and
Muslim world, a news media that
magnifies the conflict and violence,
and a more sophisticated advocacy
campaign by the American Arab and
Muslim communities.
We will need to redouble and refine
our efforts to maintain strong support
for the U.S.-Israel relationship within
Congress and the Bush administra-
tion. We will need to be even more
active in our work with the news
media.
And, last but not least, we will need
to build a knowledgeable and commit-
ted corps of activists who are prepared
to advocate effectively for the long-
standing ties between our country and
Israel. ❑

lence, renewed hostility from the Arab
states, and Israel's domestic Jew-ver-
sus-Jew and Jew-versus-Arab prob-
lems, time might be short.
If he forms a government, Ariel
Sharon will become Israel's sixth
prime minister in nine years. Already,
Jew and Arab doubt his cabinet will
last long.
Like Ehud Barak, less than halfway
into a full four-year term before
Sharon ousted him in a landslide, the
prime minister-elect confronts a frag-
mented Knesset. Seventeen parties
divide 120 seats. Another unstable
coalition of squabbling parties appears
inevitable.
No news there. Binyamin
Netanyahu, whom Barak defeated in a
landslide a year short of his own possi-
ble four-year tenure, faced similar par-
liamentary chaos.
Knesset factions range in size from
one to 23 seats. In the national unity
government Sharon proposes (itself
reflective of democratic gridlock), the
two biggest parties — Labor and

Likud — together would still fall 19
short of the narrowest 61-seat govern-
ing majority.
Israel's ultimate isolation puts a pre-
mium on effective self-rule and unity
built of consensus. But Israel's existing
political institutions obstruct consen-
sus-building.

Israel's Democratic Dead-End

Washington
s Israel — with its existing
democratic institutions — gov-
ernable? And if not, is it viable?
True, the Jewish state boasts
of the only genuinely democratic elec-
tions in the Middle East. But democ-
ratic elections don't necessarily mean
effective democracy.
Italy, during most of the post-
World War II era, featured plenty of
elections and even more revolving-
door governments. But that did not
really matter: no large domestic
minority or threatening neighbors
challenged Italy's legitimacy. In any
case, NATO protected Rothe regard-
less of its parliamentary anarchy.
Israel; of course, is not Italy. Its five
million Jews are on their own. This
puts a premium on effective self-rule

Eric L. Rozenman is executive editor
of the ffnai B'rith International Jewish
Monthly. The opinions expressed are his
own.

2/16

2001

32

and unity built of
consensus. But it
is just such con-
sensus-building
that Israel's exist-
ing political insti-
tutions obstruct.

ERIC L.
ROZENMAN
Special
Commentary

Fragmented
Knesset

Israelis used to say
they'd fix their
faulty governmen-
tal structure after
they took care of
more important things — reaching
peace with the Arabs; reconciling the
Orthodox and the secular; slashing
taxes, reducing persistently high
unemployment and excessive poverty
amidst prosperity.
In reality, Israel's Jewish majority
may not be able to do any of those
things, unless it overhauls its constitu-
tional system. And judging by the
accelerating parade of prime ministers,
intensifying cycles of Palestinian vio-

Rule Of Factions

Reform proposals go back decades.
Legalists prefer adoption of a written
constitution, with real separation of
powers between the executive, legisla-
tive and judicial branches. U.S.-style
balance hardly exists now:
Israel's anchor-less supreme court
redefines the country from a Jewish
state to a state of its citizens on its
own and, apparently, beyond appeal.
The attorney general warns a caretaker
prime minister against substantive
negotiations with the Palestinian
Arabs, but the latter careens ahead.
Coalition payoffs raid the treasury

DEAD-END on page 34

