CONGREGATION SHAAREY ZEDEK
4
aus•I•1111,
0
"
Honors our Past and Present Raznahniks
as we celebrate
•
50 Years of
Camp Ramah
Ramah style Service, 'Dinner and Ruach
Featuring Rabbi Mitch Cohen-
Director of Camp Ramah in Canada
All past, present and future campers and staff
and their families are welcome
Friday November 14 - e:3oPm
Service & 'Dinner - Your Check is your Reservation
Adults - $14.42
Children under 12 - $7.21
3% goes to Momon
9:00AM
Past and Present campers and staff will be honored with an Aliyah
Congregation Shaarey Zedek - Southfield, MI
Call Helen Medwed for more information - 539-4673
Anybed
Can ,
Jewel
ut Nobody
rovides Services
Et Discounts
•• • • • • • • • • • • •
AIL
•
THERE IS A DIFFERENCE.
WEINTRAUB JEWELERS
Oa
11/7
1997
36
In-store Specials Everyday
Sunset Strip • 29536 Northwestern Hwy.
Southfield • 248-357-4000
Hours: Mon. -Sat. 0-5
TRUST YOUR NEXT CATERED AFFAIR TO THE FINEST KOSHER CATERER
We Cater At
• Weddings
Most
• Bar/Bat Mitzvahs
Synagogues,
• Showers
Temples,
• Banquets
Hotels
• Anniversaries
and
the Halls
• Reunions
Of
Your
• Birthdays
Choice
• Etc.
CLASSIC CUISINE
Approved by Council of Orthodox Rabbis
TEWEL
Food and Beverage Director
Sadat's Left A Legacy
To The Peace Talks
DR. KENNETH M. STEIN
Special to The Jewish News
with a
Saturday November 15 -
Middle East
(810) 6614050
Farmington Hills, Michigan
N
ovember 19, 1997, marks
the 20th anniversary of
Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat's historic trip to
Jerusalem. What motivated this Arab
leader to go to Israel's capital? And
what legacy did Sadat leave for the
Arab-Israeli negotiating process?
Like his predecessor Nasser, Sadat
wanted Egyptian national interests to
take precedence over all other Arab
interests. Unlike Nasser, Sadat had no
intention to destroy the state of
Israel. He understood Egypt's military
limitations and the meaning of
Washington's close ties to Jerusalem.
, Sadat's top priority of promoting
Egyptian national interests included
turning from Moscow and toward
Washington for economic and mili-
tary assistance, and opening Egypt's
stagnant economy to foreign invest-
ment.
Above all, it required returning all
of Egyptian Sinai to Cairo's control.
Until that was accomplished, Sadat
gave marginal priority to the
Palestinians and to the interests of
other Arab countries.
In October 1973, Sadat did not go
to war to destroy Israel, or even to
take all of Sinai; he planned to
achieve a limited military success. He
understood his military limitations;
he wanted Nixon and Kissinger to
notice his country's plight and as an
"opening" to harness Washington's
involvement.
Immediately, Nixon and Kissinger
sought to utilize Sadat's bold action as
a vehicle to remove Soviet influence
from Egypt in particular, and reduce
it from the Middle East in general.
On the second day of the October
war, Sadat cabled Kissinger via CIA
channels telling the Secretary of State
that he had no intention of launching
a full war against Israel. Rather, he
hoped that the war would stimulate
Washington's diplomatic engagement
in concluding an Israeli withdrawal
from Sinai.
_ In exchange, Sadat pragmatically
accepted a cold version of non-bel-
ligerency with Israel; not until 1977
was he reluctantly prepared to sign a
separate peace with Israel.
In disengaging entangled armies at
the end of the war, limited force and
Dr. Kenneth W. Stein is a professor
of Near Eastern history and political sci-
ence at Emory University.
limited armament zones were estab-
lished. Still not sure whether to trust -
Sadat's intentions, Israel Defense
Minister Moshe Dayan wanted no
more than 300 Egyptian tanks to
remain on Egypt's recently recon-
quered east bank of the Suez Canal.
When the disengagement negotia-
tions were about to conclude in
January 1974, Sadat startled
Kissinger. Rather than 300 tanks as
Dayan had approved, Sadat requested
only 30. Egyptian Army Chief of
Staff al-Gamasy, who planned and
executed the war so successfully, was
stunned by the unexpected decision.
With consternation, he replied to
Sadat, "Impossible. No, this is
Egyptian land conquered by the
Egyptian forces, with the price of
blood and of sacrifice. How can I
withdraw my army like this? I can't
defend that in front of my troops. I
don't accept that."
Twenty years ago
the Egyptian
leader boldly
went to
to
Jerusalem
surprise
Washington.
C
Emphatically, Sadat replied,
"Never forget, I am making this [dis-
engagement] agreement with the
United States, not with Israel." When
Jimmy Carter became president,
American policy toward resolving the,---
Arab-Israeli conflict turned toward a
comprehensive peace; no more step-
by-step diplomacy, emblematic of
Kissinger's successful efforts in 1974
and 1975.
Carter "the engineer" and Secretary
of State Cy Vance "the lawyer" found
it philosophically compatible to seek
a reconvened international Middle
_
East peace conference.
In 1977, neither Israel Prime
Minister Rabin nor later Menahem
Begin were totally opposed. Yet, for
Sadat, the Carter administration
became deeply mired in the procedur-
al details about Palestinian representa-
tion, Russian participation, and