Handicapism.
It's Thinking
That People
With Disabilities
Are Different.

People with disa-
bilities are really like
the rest of us—diverse,
complex, each with
different strengths
and weaknesses,
likes and dislikes.

Sometimes they
may need more help
than you do. But they
always need a smile,
a hello, respect and
dignity. Just like you.

Treat every person
you meet like a
person. It's as simple
as that.

A Jewish Association for Residential Care
for persons with developmental disabilities

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ewish Community Center of Metropolitan Detroit

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110

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With Love, The Simmer Family

Breast
self-examination —
LEARN. Call us.

1 P S A OTE9r

4

INTIFADA page 109

had drawn up, which, in con-
trast to Chairman Arafat's
uncompromising stridency,
advocated negotiations with
Israel and hinted at a two-
state solution.
Neither Chairman Arafat
or the Arab leaders alluded
to the document and it was
barely noticed by the
assembled international
media. The prospect of a sea-
change in the PLO was de-
tected only after the docu-
ment was published in the
Arabic-language al-Fajr in
East Jerusalem a week
later.
Once Mr. Abu Sharif's
plan appeared in the Wash-
ington Post, the PLO leader,
_ under enormous pressure
from the Palestinians in the
territories, West Europe
leaders and U.S. officials,
was set on a roller-coaster
that would carry him to a
special session of the UN
General Assembly in
Geneva six months later.
Having been dragged back
from the irrelevance of
Tunis, Chairman Arafat was
once again thrust into the
media spotlight and, after an
emotional, but inadequate,
address to the Assembly,
convened a late-night press
conference in Room 19 of the
Palais des Nations, Euro-
pean headquarters of the
UN.
There, flanked by aides, he
read a carefully prepared
statement in which he re-
nounced terrorism and ac-
knowledged UN resolutions
242 and 338, which not only
demanded Israeli
withdrawal from occupied
territories but also implicit-
ly acknowledged Israel's
right -to exist.
The declaration contained
the precise formulation of
words that had been
demanded by the U.S. and
was the key to opening the
door to an official dialogue
with Washington, the first
tangible — and most signifi-
cant — fruit of the intifada.
It was a platform from
which the PLO leader could
have launched a powerful
and persuasive campaign for
Palestinian self-
determination.
Instead, Chairman Arafat
set about systematically
squandering the diplomatic
capital that had been ac-
cumulated at such a high
price by the intifada. In June
1990, after he declined to
disavow an attempted
seaborne terrorist attack on
Israel by a senior PLO af-
filiate, the U.S. suspended
all official contacts with the
PLO. Two months later,
when Saddam Hussein's
tanks rolled across Kuwait,

he again misread the polit-
ical map, enthusiastically
embracing the Iraqi dictator.
That was too much even
for his European friends to
swallow and regular min-
isterial-level contacts with
the PLO were suspended in
most of their capitals. It also
was too much for the Gulf
states, which instantly se-
vered the financial lifeline
that had sustained and nur-
tured the PLO.
. As Chairman Arafat lur-
ched from one gaffe to an-
other, including endorse-
ment of the abortive Soviet
coup against Mikhail Gor-
bachev in August 1991, the
Palestinian masses
exhausted themselves on the
rock of Israeli determination
not to answer violence with
concessions.
By the time of the Madrid
peace conference in October
1991, the PLO had been so
weakened that it was offi-
cially excluded from the pro-
cess and the Palestinians

Chairman Arafat
set about
sysematically
squandering the
diplomatic capital
that had been
accumulated.

were represented, as Israel
had demanded from the
outset, by delegates drawn
exclusively from within the
territories.
Far from translating the
diplomatic success of the in-
tifada into tangible political
gains, Chairman Arafat had
sent the Palestinians down a
series of self-destructive
blind alleys.
Today, simultaneously fac-
ing the most compromising
Israeli government and
mounting pressure from
elements opposed to the
peace process, the PLO
leader is threatening to pull
the Palestinians out of
negotiations as part of a
strategy to hold out for max-
imum Palestinian gains. If
he does, and if they meekly
follow, he will be leading
them into the most
dangerous impasse of all.
As Israel moved to repeal
the law against contact with
PLO officials, it was clear
that the Palestinians in the
territories would be unlikely
to conclude an autonomy
agreement as long as they
continue to defer to Chair-
man Arafat. ❑