as possible to their pre- invasion way of life. PLO leaders learned nothing and forgot nothing. Other than making efforts to win favor with Washington, the Syrian government remains the same as before — building an arsenal, ruling Lebanon, trying to dominate the Palestinians, trafficking in drugs. Overall, the war jiggled a great deal without spurring the range of fundamental changes I expect; d. Why did so little change? In part this has to do with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Kuwaiti crisis and the war against Iraq almost disappeared because of the press of other devel- opments. The whole event feels long ago and quite apart from today's immedi- ate concerns. The nature of the Middle East, a region with an incor- rigible tendency to domina- tion and strife, also has something to do with the lack of change. This is a place where ethnic and re- ligious-based hatreds last for generations; where political passions regularly overrule economic requirements; and where the imperatives of dictatorial rule negate dem- ocratic or humane leanings. It is also a region which marches to its own beat, and is nearly immune to such happy global developments as democratization, increas- ed respect for human rights, and greater scope for the market. Rule of law remains an ex- ception, as does freedom of expression and sustained economic growth. After Desert Storm Disappointment This melancholic conclu- sion implies the need to use caution when predicting change in the Middle East. The Kuwait war is not the only event to have come and gone. Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem failed to shake up the region as much as ex- pected, nor did the Iraq-Iran war, or the intifada. Even the Iranian Revo- lution, after 13 years, has had a smaller impact than seemed likely at its start. Details shift but the basic picture remains surprisingly stagnant. Americans should learn to NOAM M.M. NEUSNER keep their aspirations Staff Writer modest when it comes to the ne year after Scud Middle East. With the ex- missiles rained on Tel ception of the Middle East's Aviv, memories of the two democracies, Turkey Gulf War have been discard- and Israel, Washington ed as quickly as litter after a should keep its distance. parade. To get too involved permits the misdeeds and failures of For American Jews, others to become our own. images of Israelis dodging Our will and our means Scuds seemed, at the time, are limited: we probably like unforgettable cannot reconstruct Iraq as memories. Thousands turn- we did Japan or Germany. ed out for rallies across the Nor is our example likely to country, including here in prevail; Egyptians and Detroit. Many wept for the Saudis have little use for our safety of Israel, which political system. Saddam Hussein threatened This is not a call for dis- with chemical warheads. engagement, much less While the commitment to isolationism. As in the case Israel did not cease after the of Iraqi aggression, the U.S. war's conclusion, the long- government should use its term effect of the war is influence to address specific widely doubted by many. problems: the security of "This is a little blip on the Israel, the stability of "Ns screen of human history," moderate Arab regimes, the said Mark Finkelstein, di- free flow of oil, and the sup- rector of the Hillel Founda- pression of terrorism. But it tion at Michigan State Uni- must know its limits and not versity. believe that the region is For many American Jews, amenable to improvements the Gulf War was a horrify- along American lines. ❑ ing experience. But unlike the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when Arab nations threatened to literally push Israelis into the sea, the Gulf War was not a watershed moment for American Jews. "Jews have always been aware of how precarious Israel's position is," said Conrad Giles, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Detroit. "For American Jews, this was not eye opening," he said. Dr. Giles said that he first got involved in Jewish communal life because of the '67 war. The Gulf War, he said, "was not that kind of seminal event." This trend, some note, reflects the sense throughout America that the Gulf War, although fought skillfully, did not Daniel Pipes: modest expectations. Reality did not live up to the great expectations. 0 After a Scud attack in Tel Aviv, a woman salvages family photos. succeed in effecting any long-term change in the Middle East. As Arab nations and Israel slog through peace talks and Saddam Hussein con- solidates his grip on power, many feel that the war was fought for nought. Israelis, in particular, were disappointed in the war's -final outcome, espe- cially since they were asked to restrain from responding to the barrage of Iraqi Scud attacks. "It was a war that Israel was part of, but it wasn't an Israeli war," said Sivan Maas, director of Detroit's Israel Program Center. Israel, she noted, had to ask to be included in American victory parades. The war also proved to Israelis that despite Ameri- can Jewish sympathy during the war, the two com- munities are very different. "There wasn't the kind of mobilization of the Jewish diaspora as in past wars," she said. "There wasn't the sense of 'We Are One,' ." Many Israelis, she said, felt hurt by American Jew- ish reaction to the war. That disappointment is still felt today, Mrs. Maas added. "At the time, Israelis felt TUC rIPTEMIT IPIAIIC44 tome 77