Continued from preceding page

Not having to worry about Egypt,
explained Robert 0. Freedman,
dean of the graduate school at Bal-
timore Hebrew University, has
allowed Israel to redeploy its securi-
ty forces along its borders with
Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.
"Not having to keep a lot of
troops on its southern border has
given Israel freedom to move a lot of
men and equipment to other hot
spots," he said.
Louis Cantori, a political science
professor at the University of Mary-
land-Baltimore County, suggested
that it was this redeployment that
enabled Israel to move into Lebanon
in- 1982 and go after the Palestine
Liberation Organization.
And it was also that incursion,
plus the still unresolved Israeli-
Palestinian dispute, the intifada in
particular, that tempered any
Egyptian desires to turn its cold
peace with Israel into a warm one,
Mr. Canton said.
It is significant, however, that de-
spite those major differences of
opinion, the treaty has held firm.
Professor Freedman said that fact
has shown Arab leaders inclined to
make peace with Israel that it is ac-
tually possible to do so — the
assassination of Mr. Sadat and
Egypt's temporary estrangement
from its Arab neighbors notwith-
standing.
That aspect, as hard as it may be
to measure, is clearly in line with the
treaty's visionary intent, those in-
terviewed emphasized.
"The Egyptian-Israeli peace trea-
ty has had the effect of pulling along
the rest of the Arab world to where
it is today," Mr. Eisenstat said. "It
gave an important psychological
nudge to the whole process."
"The treaty was a highly signifi-
cant step in the process leading to
the eventual acceptance of a Jewish
state in the Middle East," Mr.

Egypt's peace with Israel
crossed an important
psychological barrier.

Feuerwerger added. "What the
treaty did was create new
possibilities."
Given the continued state of Is-
raeli-Arab tensions in general, he
concluded, it is naive to lament that
which has failed to materialize.
"With the facts that still exist in
the Middle East, I don't think we
realistically could have expected
more than what we have in so rela-
tively short a period of time," he
said.

❑

32

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1991

Ten Steps
To Peace:
How It Will Go

Blessed with the gift of
prophecy, the writer
explains how the
process will unfold.

ZE'EV CHAFETS

Special to The Jewish News

erusalem — During Anwar
Sadat's 1977 visit to Israel,
the late Bill Farrell, then the
New York Times Jerusalem
bureau chief, sought some man in the
street diplomatic wisdom from a local
tailor.
Journalists being copy-cats, the
tailor, nicknamed "Mifkeh" by Far-
rell, was soon inundated by dozens of
reporters looking for quotes. After
several days of being badgered, a note
appeared on his door. "The tailor is
busy," it read. "These are his political
opinions for the day."
Lately I have been feeling a bit like
Mifkeh. Everywhere I go, people ask:
What will happen in the peace proc-
ess? What does it all mean?
Now I doubtless have more time on
my hands than Bill Farrell's tailor,
but it gets tedious answering the
same questions time after time. On
the other hand, it doesn't seem fair
not to share my gift of prophecy.
Thus, as a one-time public service,
I hereby provide the scenario for the
peace process as it will unfold over
the next few years.
One: The peace conference will in-
deed convene, despite last minute
crises and solemn declarations that
one side or another will not attend.
You can ignore them. Nobody in this
region has the courage not to show
up.
Two: At the conference, the Arabs
will demand total withdrawal. We will
insist on keeping everything. The
conference will break up in an at-
mosphere of acrimony. Middle East
experts will fill the airwaves with

Mr. Chafets is editor of The Jerusalem
Report, from which this piece is
reprinted.

are prepared to join the peace talks.
Arafat will call them traitors and
have one or two assassinated, caus-
ing so much fear and outrage that the
West Bankers will turn to King Hus-
sein for protection by joining a
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Mr.
Shamir will try to wiggle out of
meeting with them, but Mr. Bush and
Mr. Baker will threaten to cut off aid
and he'll cave in.
Eight: There will be a new round of
talks. For a year you won't be able to
turn on the radio without hearing
diplomacy babble. This will be a good
time to get hooked up to cable TV.
Nine: That brings us into 1993,
when Mr. Bush, safely re-elected, will
turn up the heat. Mr. Assad, King
Hussein and Mr. Shamir will get
command-performance invitations to
show up personally for a summit in
Washington. Mr. Assad and King
Hussein will say yes; Mr. Shamir will
say no, and resign.
Thn: In an internal election, the
Likud will choose Moshe Arens as his
successor. He will appoint Arik
Sharon as defense minister in return
for his support, form a unity govern-
ment with Labor and go to the sum-
mit. Naturally, one meeting, no
matter how dramatic, will not settle
everything, but from then on, the
final shape of the agreement will be
clear. In early 1994, when the parties
meet on the White House lawn to
sign the papers, it will look some-
thing like this:
• The Golan is returned to Syria in
exchange for full peace, including an
exchange of ambassadors, demilitari-
zation and the right of Israeli settlers
to remain, as foreign residents, for 99
years;
• Gaza becomes a U.N. protecto-
rate. America undertakes a Marshall
Plan, with (reluctant) Saudi help, to
rebuild the camps and resettle
refugees;
• The West Bank is divided be-
tween Israel and Jordan. Israel keeps
Hebron, Bethlehem, Jericho and
most of the Jordan Valley; the rest is
given up. All residents, both Jewish
and Arab, are allowed to remain in
place, with an option to keep their
present citizenship or acquire that of
the new sovereign.
• East Jerusalem stays Israeli,
with Jordanian control of the Muslim
holy places.
Well, that's that — like it or not,
you now know what's coming.
Of course, if you want a second
opinion, you could always drop by
and check with Mifkeh.

assurances that the parties are too far
apart to negotiate, let alone reach an
agreement. Most of them will blame
Israel. Some Israelis, believing that
we are on the brink of disaster, will
panic. You can stay calm, though;
there will be no disaster. Secretary
Baker will make a dramatic visit to
the region, pressure Mr. Assad and
Mr. Shamir, and they will come
around. Bilateral talks with the
Syrians will begin early in 1992.
Three: The Palestinians will not
return to the negotiating table be-
cause they are Palestinians, the
world's leading practitioners of self-
mutilation. Arab governments and
Western keffiyeh-sniffers will insist
that they are still the heart of the
problem, and that no deal can be cut
without them. Don't worry. They are
not the heart of the problem, and
Assad will make a deal without them.
Four: Not right away, though. First
it will take three years of wrangling,
name calling, demonstrative walk-
outs, political posturing, threats and
counter threats.
Five: In the middle of all this
shouting, Yitzhak Shamir will hold
an election. He will win a clear vic-
tory, but not by a big enough margin
to establish a one party government.
Labor will beg to be included in a uni-
ty coalition, but Mr. Shamir will pre-
fer the religious parties. The peace
process will be a very lucrative deal
for the rabbis.
Six: After the election, armed with
a mandate and supported by the hap-
less opposition Laborites, Mr. Shamir
will begin dropping hints that he
might cut a deal on the Golan, if
Israel gets to keep the West Bank
and Gaza. Assad will give a public no,
while privately signaling that he is
prepared to listen. The Israeli hawks
will holler about another Yamit, and
Mr. Shamir will reassure them that
Israel will never leave the Heights.
Seven: In the meantime, the PLO
will announce a new campaign of in-
ternational terror ("struggle" is the
revolutionary term). This will go over
with the Americans like radioactive
humus. A group of West Bank Copyright — The Jerusalem Report
Palestinians will announce that they Syndication Service

❑