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March 08, 1991 - Image 33

Resource type:
Text
Publication:
The Detroit Jewish News, 1991-03-08

Disclaimer: Computer generated plain text may have errors. Read more about this.

AR ' S E N D

Brian Galison
14, ninth grade, West

Bloomfield High School

"I think Saddam Hussein
achieved a major goal of
getting his name out. But
his own people and
soldiers hate him. I hope
he's tried as a war crimi-
nal when they find him."

months, it may have failed
to notice the growing con-
tradiction between global
expectations and regional
realities.
The task of resolving the
Arab-Israeli conflict, always
daunting, has been made
more so by the fact that the
three key players — Israel,
Jordan and the Palestinians
— have never been less
susceptible to conciliation
than they are today.
Israel is now ruled by the
most right-wing government
in its 43-year history. Just in
case that message was lost
on the international com-
munity, Rehavam Ze'evi,
whose Moledet (Homeland)
Party advocates the
wholesale transfer of Pales-
tinians out of the territories,
was last month added to
Prime Minister Yitzhak
Shamir's cabinet.
Jordan, which has a
majority Palestinian popula-
tion, is an essential element
in any negotiations, but
King Hussein has been seri-
ously compromised by his
support for Iraq, and Mr.
Baker pointedly omitted
Jordan from his itinerary.
And even though the sec-
retary has also said that
King Hussein might still
play an important role, the
beleaguered monarch simply
can't afford to further in-
flame his Palestinian sub-
jects by appearing to deal
with the Americans, let
alone with Israel, so soon
after Iraq's crushing defeat.
King Hussein is clearly
not going to succeed in
stabilizing his nation, econ-
omically or politically, in
time to satisfy the urgent
American need to produce

some progress, or at least an
appearance of progress.
Nor can PLO chairman
Yassir Arafat quickly, if
ever, win back the credibili-
ty and trust that he
squandered through his
unequivocal support of
Saddam after the savage
rape of Kuwait, an ominous
portent for Israel.
All of this, of course, does
nothing to satisfy the White
House's urgent need to show
some quick movement on the
Arab-Israeli conflict to satis-
fy its Arab coalition partners
and appease their restive
populations.
So like Gen. Schwarkopf,
Washington may choose not
to attack this issue head on.
Instead, it may decide to
outflank the issue complete-
ly by focusing on a subject
that is of intense interest to
all parties in the aftermath
of the Gulf War: arms con-
trol in the Middle East.
It is a topic that is likely to
provoke a great deal of in-
terest, generate a heated
debate, consume enormous
energy and, ultimately, go
nowhere.
The U.S. is unlikely to suc-
ceed in reducing the deadly
stockpiles by a single
Kalachnikov, but by getting
the parties to talk about the
issue, it will generate the
appearance of movement.
Most unexpected of all, by
concentrating Arab and
Israeli minds on a subject of
intense mutual interest,
Washington just might kick
start a process that will set
the tone for a broader dia-
logue and build the con-
fidence necessary to carry
the Arabs and Israelis to the
conference table.
The United States does in-
deed have powerful leverage
over Israel. It can delay the
delivery of weapons and
spare parts, suspend con-
tracts and equivocate over
aspects of the complex web of
agreements and understan-
dings between the two coun-
tries.
It might even threaten to
cut its annual $3.8 billion
aid package at a time when
Israel is hungry for even
more assistance, not only to
compensate for war damage
but also to absorb the tens of
thousands of Soviet Jews
streaming into the country.
All this should provide
Israel with an incentive to
toe the line. But such incen-
tives have not had signifi-
cant effects in the past and
are unlikely to have any
now.
Israel remains confident
that, while the administra-
tion is not particularly sen-
sitive to its concerns, Jerusa-

lem retains powerful support
on Capital Hill and that Con-
gress wills tand at its side.
At the same time, Mr.
Shamir himself has never
been so popular. His cool
handling of the recent Crisis
has won him widespread
admiration while his opposi-
tion, and the entire "peace
camp," has been demoraliz-
ed by Palestinian support for
Iraq.
It's been clear since the
start of the Gulf crisis that
the political heat would be
turned up on Israel as soon
as the danger was past, and
the prime minister, a sharp
and calculating operator,
has marshalled his forces ac-
cordingly.
His strategy will be replete

with promise but short on
substance. It will be a
carefully orchestrated public
relations campaign aimed at
accentuating the positive,
appearing to move forward
while actually standing still.
Mr. Shamir is an ac-
complished prevaricator and
Israeli government sources
say that he is gambling on
riding out the storm until
President Bush becomes
totally absorbed in his re-
election campaign next year.
Beyond that, however, the
prime minister is convinced
that the Bush administra-
tion is practiced in the art of
the possible and recognizes
that the conditions for a set-
tlement between Israel and
the Palestinians are simply
not presently available.

So when Secretary Baker
comes calling, Mr. Shamir
will make much of the point
that Israel can hardly be ex-
pected to compromise its
security while the Arab
world is ruled by dictators
and autocrats, any one of
whom might one day become
another Saddam.
At the same time Mr.
Shamir will issue calls — no
doubt sincere — for direct,
bilateral negotiations bet-
ween Israel and its Arab
neighbors, while firmly re-
jecting an international
peace conference under
United Nations auspices.
He will also project en-
thusiasm for a settlement of
the Palestinian problem,
while emphatically rejecting
territorial concessions.



RNS/Reu ters Photo

COMMENT

Flags painted on the face of this woman in Tel Aviv indicate the joy felt over the U.S. led victory.

-

THE DETROIT JEWISH NEWS

33

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