EDITORIAL
Seize The Day
It has been a long time since Americans
have taken such pride in their military as
this week. Not only was the U.S.-led coali-
tion successful in its ground war against
Iraq, but many Americans were secure in
the moral correctness of their govern-
ment's war against Saddam Hussein.
Many of the ghosts of the Vietnam expe-
rience were laid to rest in the sands of
Kuwait and Iraq.
Israel, too, expressed satisfaction with
America's aggressive pursuit of Saddam.
Whether or not President Bush is a Zionist
hero, as M.J. Rosenberg described him in
these pages last week, the president is to be
congratulated for the firm resolve he has
shown in taking on Saddam. The United
States has come to recognize the threat
Iraq represents to Israel and has done its
best to prevent Scud missile attacks
against Israel's civilian population. And in
pursuing the ground war with vigor, Mr.
Bush has shown an appreciation for the
fact that only a total military and political
defeat of Saddam would lead to a chance for
Mideast stability.
It is naive to think that any single event,
even one as dramatic as the defeat of
Saddam, would result in a peaceful Middle
East. But the success of the U.S.-led coali-
tion creates possibilities for new ap-
proaches to long-standing problems.
The war managed to place Israel on the
same side as some of her most implacable
enemies, namely Syria and Saudi Arabia.
Further, the Palestine Liberation Organ-
ization and its leader, Yassir Arafat, have
lost influence and support. Arafat lost dip-
lomatic clout with the U.S. and Europe by
backing Saddam. He also lost financial
support from the Saudis for his actions.
Now is the time for Israel to seize the in-
itiative and pursue its peace proposal
regarding the Palestinians, challenging
them to find alternative leadership to an
Arafat who has led them from failure to
failure.
In much the same way that Israel
handled itself with a remarkable show of
control and restraint, it must begin
preparing for the new world order's next
point of focus, the West Bank.
It is unclear if in President Bush's view
there is room for a Palestinian state and a
Jewish state co-existing in peace. In Israel,
the rise of anti-Arab feelings among Jews
has reached new heights. At the same
time, any effort to achieve a moderate Pa-
lestinian point of view usually ends up in
the death of the Palestinian seeking to rec-
ognize Israel as well as peace.
The war may be ending, but Israel can be
certain of a few more missiles, both
figurative and literal, along the way. And
Israel knows that now, more than ever, any
future U.S. aid could depend on its diplo-
matic conduct.
Only a good plan will allow the Israelis to
emerge with the continued world respect
they now enjoy.
Dry Bones
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Iraq War Changes
Middle East Equation
MITCHELL G. BARD
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What Now For Israel?
It's been difficult to write about what is
going on in Israel during the Persian Gulf
war. The changing face of war makes fresh
ideas old with one blast of a deadly Scud
missile or a new missive from the tongue of
Saddam. Hussein.
But as we watch Hussein go down in
stunning defeat to President Bush's new
world order, we must ask ourselves where
Israel now stands. Israel learned that in
this war, its greatest military weapon was
restraint. And because of its posture, it has
gained respect from the world's most im-
portant players.
Now Israel must face the real possibility
that the focus of Middle East tensions will
shift away from Iraq and back to the Pales-
tinian front. While the Palestinians have
again shot themselves in their collective
feet by backing Saddam Hussein, the issue
of the occupied West Bank has not gone
away. If anything, the temperature has
been turned up under the simmering ques-
tion.
K
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IN ome
9111.esegNIANS
or years analysts pre-
dicted the next major
American military con-
flict would occur in the Mid-
dle East. The principal deter-
rent was the fear that such a
conflagration would result in
a superpower confrontation.
Ironically, the improvement
in East-West tensions made it
more likely that the United
States would become involved
in a Middle East war.
No one in the United States
seriously considered Iraq a
threat to American interests.
It was the Soviet Union and,
since 1979, Iran, that were
thought to be the most likely
nations to place Western oil
supplies at risk.
Of course, it is well
documented that the United
States aided Iraq in its war ef-
fort against Iran. Moreover,
the Bush Administration all
but ignored Saddam Hus
sein's bellicose rhetoric and
looked for ways to improve
relations with Iraq. Just days
before Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, in fact, officials were
still trying to derail Congres-
sional efforts to impose sanc-
tions against Iraq.
Had Saddam been satisfied
with the annexation of
Kuwait and quickly
withdrawn, he might have ac-
complished most of his objec-
tives. He would have cancell-
ed his debts, obtained control
over 20 percent of the world's
oil, and intimidated the other
Gulf states.
The United States appeared
prepared to sacrifice Kuwait
to appease Saddam. By
Bard is a foreign policy
analyst in Washington, D.C.
D7:
threatening the Saudis,
however, he overplayed his
hand and placed America's
vital interests at risk.
The response to Iraq's
threats against Saudi Arabia
dramatically demonstrated
the U.S. interest in the Arab
world is based on the ac-
cessibility of oil. This was
never in doubt. What was
questionable was the attitude
of America's Arab friends.
The crisis has forced them to
stand up and be counted and
their behavior has been in-
structive. It also will have
repercussions for future U.S.
policy.
The key, of course, was the
Saudis. Given their timidity
The stock of "the
plucky king" has
dropped
precipitously.
and historical reluctance to
cooperate with the United
States, the decision to allow
U.S. troops to land on Saudi
soil was remarkable. The
reason Americans believe
they took the risk was that
Defense Secretary Richard
Cheney convinced them an
Iraqi invasion was a possibili-
ty and made clear they should
not expect so much as a
screwdriver from the United
States in the future if they
refused American assistance.
Mr. Cheney might have put
it another way, that is, sug-
gesting the Saudis would be
able to get whatever military
equipment they wanted if
they cooperated.
Egypt's credibility has been
furher damaged by recent
events. For the last year,
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