INSIGHT THE JEWISH NATIONAL FUND TNE OF GREATER DETROIT '21112iLt Invites you to attend the Keter Shem Toy Award Dinner honoring The army may soon turn to harsher military means in putting down the Palestinian revolt. Israel May Soon Use A Much Heavier Hand JACK AND MIRIAM SHENKMAN In recognition of their leadership, many services and contributions to the Community, the State of Michigan, the Nation and the State of Israel. THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 1989 Congregation Shaarey Zedek 27375 Bell Road, Southfield Cocktails: 6 p.m. Dinner: 7 p.m. Couvert 180 General Chairman: DAVID B. HERMELIN Associate Chairrmen: LAWRENCE S. JACKIER D. DAN KAHN Dinner Vice Chairpersons: Norman Allan Elaine J. Beresh Louis Berry Harold Beznos Paul Borman Morris and Tillie Brandwine Allen Charlupski Gloria and Martin Cohen Henry Dorfman Ann Y. Eisenberg Marcy Feldman Martin R. Goldman Erwin and Sylvia Harvith David B. Holtzman Richard Kughn Irving Laker Eric Yale Lutz Michael Maddin David Mondry Ann Newman Irving Nusbaum Michael Perlman Jack Robinson Richard Rosenhaus Emma Schaver Arnold and Devorah Shenkman Martin and Shelly Shenkman I. William Sherr Robert Sosnick Bernard Stollman Max Stollman Phillip Stollman Lawrence Wolfe Jack Zwick For further information and reservations, please call JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (313) 557-7016 or (313) 557-7059 46 FRIDAY, JUNE 16, 1989 GIORA SHAMIS AND LOUIS RAPOPORT Special to The Jewish News erusalem — The Israeli army is in the process of major changes, a direct result of the failure of its commanders to put down the Palestinian uprising. This week, Amram Mitzna, the general in charge of the Cen- tral Command, which in- cludes the West Bank, asked to be relieved of his duties. We believe the chief of staff, Dan Shomron, is the next to go. And in the current crush of epoch world events, we would not be surprised if Israel took some dramatic military ac- tion in the near future. Mitzna shaped the army's methods for dealing with both the intifada and the responses of the Jewish set- tlers. But many critics, from the right and now from the left, are saying that the big- gest failure in the army is the chief of staff himself, Shomron. Only once before in Israeli history has the political leadership sacrificed the chief of staff at a time of war. Just after the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the prime minister, Golda Meir, asked for the resignation of Chief of Staff David Elazar, in order to save her own political skin. Shamir and Rabin ap- pear ready to act similarly; or they could neutralize Dan Shomron through reshuffling his senior staff, giving more authority to Deputy Chief of Staff Ehud Barak. In the coming weeks, the IDF's tactics will be changed drastically, and a much heavier hand will be used to suppress the Arab revolt — something that Dan Shomron has consistently opposed. The j changes in the Israeli military have come about because of several related fac- tors that seem to be converg- ing. The average Israeli is fed up with a political and military leadership which is regarded as inept and in- decisive in dealing with the Palestinians. In the last few months, much of the anger was focused on army com- manders like Shomron and Mitzna, who backed the school of thought that there is no military solution to the in- tifada. Now that anger is beginning to focus on Shomron's boss, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and on Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir himself. Shamir and Rabin were so preoccupied with holding together the na- tional unity government and their Palestinian elections in- itiative that they did not pay heed to the changes in the mood of the nation. Sudden- ly, they are trying to win back popular political support through changes in the army. Shamir this week told Likud leaders, "The government is now working to introduce an improved plan for the IDF and other security forces to crack the intifada." Why has it taken 18 months for Shamir to decide that the in- tifada should be crushed? Shamir is a man who reacts slowly to events, mainly to buy time, and he is no in- novator. He used the moderate approach toward suppressing the intifada in order to develop a political strategy to counter the enor- mous gains of the Palestine Liberation Organization. But now, it is becoming obvious to him that his political strategy cannot work if the intifada continues at the same level.