School children in Israel conduct a civil defense exercise.
distributing gas masks and chemical
weapon antidotes to inhabitants of
Shlomi and Tzomet, two Jewish set-
tlements near lel Aviv.
It is estimated that in an emergen-
cy the process of handing out gas
masks and chemical weapons antidotes
to every Israeli citizen would take some
four days.
The army had been reluctant to en-
trust the protective equipment to
Israelis because when gas masks were
handed out in the past, they appeared
at fancy dress parties and were used by
spray-painters to avoid inhaling nox-
ious fumes.
Now, apparently, it has been decid-
ed that the threat is serious enough to
try again — hoping Israelis will take
the threat more seriously and not
abuse the equipment.
How would the Arabs use chemical
weapons against Israel? According to
conventional wisdom, chemical
weapons are not a first-strike option.
In the Gulf War, Iraq generally
resorted to chemical weapons when it
considered its vital interests threaten-
ed and when it concluded its own forces
were unable to withstand the intense
Iranian offensives, such as in Basra
and the Faw Peninsula.
It is considered most likely that, in
the event of a clash between Israel and
Syria, Damascus would use its
substantial stockpile of chemically-
tipped weapons to limit Israel's
response and deter it from inflicting a
total defeat.
"Based on the lessons of the Gulf
War," notes Levran, "gas may be used
in the event of an imminent military
collapse."
A full-scale war, however, would
raise the likelihood of Syria using its
chemically-tipped missiles for first-
strike purposes. In such circumstances,
say military planners, the Syrians may
aim their weapons at Israel's popula-
tion centers.
The purpose of such a strike would
be to inflict a stunning psychological
Strategic Significance
DORE GOLD
A
Special to The Jewish News
t this month's internation-
al conference on chemical
weaponry in Paris, several
Arab delegations argued that any
arms control in the area of
chemical weapons in the Middle
East must be coupled with regional
nuclear arms control as well.
Representatives of the Arab
chemical powers asserted,
moreover, that their controversial
drive for a chemical warfare
capability was actually linked to
Israel's reputed nuclear arsenal.
Chemical weapons, in their view,
served as a deterrant to nuclear
weapons. The Iraqi and Egyptian
delegates described both sorts of
weaponsry as "arms of mass
destruction."
Israel, for its part, insisted on
separating the two categories of
weapons so that the final declara-
tion of the Paris conference would
focus on efforts, at this stage, of
banning the manufacture,
stockpile, and actual use of
chemical weapons alone.
It was somewhat uncommon,
but this time Israel's position at a
major international conference
dealing with military
developments in the Middle East
had a large measure of interna-
tional support — especially from
the advanced industrial countries.
It was not as though the case
of the Arab chemical powers was
completely baseless, at least at
first glance. The area of contamina-
tion in a chemical missile attack is
not unlike the area immediately
contaminated by fallout after a
Hiroshima-size nuclear explosion.
New nerve gases already present
in the Middle East are many more
times lethal than World War I
chemicals like mustard gas.
Actually, as nuclear munitions
become increasingly miniaturized
and chemical munitons become
more concentrated, the destructive
gap between chemical and nuclear
weapons is likely to shrink.
Despite the limited similarities,
the consensus of the major interna-
tional powers at Paris was that
chemical and nuclear weapons
ought to be treated separately.
The superpower experience in
Europe seems to make certain im-
portant distinctions between
nuclear and chemical weapons.
While the former evolved chiefly
into a deterrent instrument, the
latter, especially in the Soviet view,
could have considerable utility as
a first-strike weapon.
The potential offensive use of
chemical weapons makes them an
even more pressing candidate for
global arms-control arrangements
than more destructive nuclear
arms.
For Israel, the superpower ex-
perience with chemical weapons is
of direct relevance. Many of the
Arab states currently engaged in
a chemical weapons buildup
receive most of their military hard-
ware and training from the Soviet
Union.
The notion that the Arab states
are arming themselves with
chemical weapons in order to deter
Israel's non-conventional options
completely ignores the fact that
several non-conventional balances
are emerging throughout the Mid-
dle East — between Iran and Iraq,
Syria and Iraq, Libya and Egypt.
Both the U.S. and Israel have
an interest in retaining a conven-
tional Middle Eastern battlefield.
That goal will involve arms control
initiatives banning chemical
weapons — like the Paris con-
ference. It will also involve main-
taining the conventional deterrent
strength of Israel in an environ-
ment in which arms control may
not be so easily applied and made
to work.
©1989 JPFS
Dore Gold is the director of the U.S.
Foreign and Defense Policy Project
at the Jaffee Centre for Strategic
Studies, Tel Aviv University.
THE DETROIT JEWISH NEWS
25