12 Friday, August 19, 1983

THE DETROIT JEWISH NEWS

Kissinger-Rogers Rift Detailed in Hersh Volume

(Continued from Page 2)
Rabin and Kissinger,
who met and talked re-
peatedly during the
crisis. In his memoirs,
Rabin told of a telephone
call from Kissinger on
Sept. 25, conveying a
message of victory and
thanks from Nixon to
Golda Meir: The

seeming willingness to
permit the Israelis to enter
his country and, if neces-
sary, do battle with the Sy-
rians. By mid-1971, Hus-
sein had fully re-
established his authority
over Jordan and ousted the
fedayeen. America's policy
in the Middle East was now
measured in terms of insur-
ing that Israel and Jordan
had enough hardware to
maintain the military bal-
ance.

"Egypt's President
Nasser died in late Sep-
tember 1970, and his suc-
cessor, Anwar Sadat,
realized that Egypt and
other Arab nations had
been frozen by Nixon's
and Kissinger's beliefs
into a pro-Soviet — and
thus anti-American —
position. Sadat and his
advisers, no longer inhib-
HENRY KISSINGER
President will never ited by Nasser's distrust
forget Israel's role in of the West, would try a
preventing the deteriora- new approach in 1971.
tion in Jordan and in But, knowing little of the
blocking the attempt to real balance of power in-
overturn the regime side . the Nixon Adminis-
there. He said that the tration, Sadat would rely
United States is fortunate on William Rogers and
in having an ally like Is- the State Department to
rael in the Middle East. relay his proposals. His
These events will be- approach thus was
taken into account in all marked for failure before
future developments." it began."
There are several refer-
Rabin understood the
significance of the Kis- ences in "The Price of
singer message, as he Power" to Nixon's anti-
wrote: "This was prob- Semitism, one being specifi-
ably the most far- cally in this aspect:
"There were days when
reaching statement ever
made by a president of Nixon would directly casti-
the United States on the gate liberal Jews in front of
mutuality of the alliance Kigsinger.
" 'Nixon would talk about
between the two coun-
Jewish traitors, and the
tries.

"The legacy of Jordan was
a new American policy in
the Middle East — never
formally stated — that
would strangle diplomacy
for the next three years. No
longer would the White
House seriously consider an
`even-handed' American
role in the Middle East, al-
though Rogers, ever more
isolated from real
authority, still talked that
way on occasion. The policy
was tilted toward Israel.
Kissinger and Nixon,
exhilarated by their suc-
cessful showdown with the
Soviet Union, would con-
tinue — until forced other-
wise — to view the basic
problem in the Middle East
as one of containing the
Soviet Union and its client
states, especially Egypt. Is-
rael was seen as the bul-
wark of that policy, a
regional American partner
willing to intervene without
question on behalf of the
Nixon-Kissinger view of the
world. More arms and eco-
nomic aid also began to flow
to King Hussein, who was
perceived as an equally un-
questioning ally for his

Eastern Jewish Establish-
ment — Jews at Harvard,'
John Ehrlichman recalls.
`And he'd play off Kissinger.
`Isn't that right, Henry?
Don't you agree?' And
Henry would respond:
`Well, Mr. President, there
are Jews and Jews.' "
An interesting item in
Hersh's book is the_ matter
of charging State Depart-
ment Arabists with being
- anti-Semitic. To quote a de-
fense of State spokesmen:

"The men and women
who served in the Middle
East for the State De-
partment and the Central
Intelligence Agency have
traditionally been con-
sidered very highly qual-
ified. A knowledge of
Arabic is essential to
career success in those
regions, and the dedica-
tion needed to master
that language seems to be
reflected in career per-
formance. The State De-
partment's Arabists have
invariably been written
off by Israel and its sup-
porters as pro-Arab and
anti-Israel, an over-
simplification that still

Shrike missiles capable of
destroying the Egyptian
missile sites. The commit-
ments were necessary be-
cause of the hostile and, at
times, hysterical reaction of
the Isreali government to
the ceasefire.

exists. A Foreign Service
officer, if he reports criti-
cally on Israeli policy in
State Department cables,
runs a risk of being
labeled anti-Semitic."

During the confronta-
tions between Israel and
Egypt, the bombing of the
latter, the talks about a
cease fire, there was, of
course, an extended Ameri-
can concern and involve-
ment. That's when Golda
Meir as prime minister, had
a role in the negotiations.
Her image is denigrated in
the Hersh review of the
events of that time. A rather
depressing and lengthy
reference to that period in
Hersh's provocative work
demands attention. Quot-
ing him:

"Golda Meir and Yit-
zhak Rabin had clashed
over Meir's initial deci-
sion to reject the State
Department ceasefire
proposal as soon as it was
proposed in late June —
and before the Egyptians
had a chance to reject it
first. 'When I received the
draft of Mrs. Meir's reply
to the President,' Rabin
wrote in his memoirs, 'I
froze in horror.' The Is-
raeli Ambassador urged
a delay and, obviously
working closely with
Nixon and Kissinger,
succeeded in 'reassuring
Meir to the point where,
by the end of July, Israel
had agreed to participate
in the ceasefire. That de-
cision was immediately
praised by Nixon, in an
impromptu visit to the
press office at San
Clemente.

"American frustration
with Meir reached a peak
during those weeks. In
mid-July, shortly before the
Egyptians agreed to the

RICHARD M. NIXON

ceasefire, the Israeli Prime
Minister suggested in an
interview with Der Spiegel,
the German news maga-
zine, that NATO and the
United States should force
the Russians out of the Mid-
dle East in a confrontation
similar to the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis. Despite her
bright public image among
Jews in the United States
and Europe, many Israelis
and Americans did not
think Meir was up to the in-
tellectual requirements of
her office. After -her death,
some leaders of the Jewish
community in the United
States privately_ acknowl-
edged in interviews that she
was narrow-minded and un-
imaginative in her ap-

proach to international
negotiations.
" 'She was intransigent,"
says one prominent leader,
who served as president of a
worldwide Jewish organiza-
tion. 'It was very difficult for
her to conceptualize.' An Is-
raeli diplomat thinks that
`Golda Meir was a poor
prime minister. She had a
great press, but did very
poorly.' Another official
says that 'many of the worst
mistakes that Israel made
diplomatically came as a re-
sult of Golda.' It should be
noted that these comments
all came from Jews who
strongly supported the Is-
raeli cause and worked un-
ceasingly for it."
Hersh's reference to the
"spite" in the Kissinger role
became apparent in the
Middle East sections of the
book as well as throughout
"The Price of Power." As a
revelation of the events af-
fecting Israel's status, the
era of the conflict with
Egypt, the Syrian threats,
the Russians as- targets in
American policies — all add
immensely to historical
interest. In these as in the
other regards, "The Price of
Power" retains a place of
great importance in current
history-writing.

— P.S.

Victor Bienstock Views Rogers Plan Surviving
as Core of Every American Future Initiative
for Solution of Continuing Middle East Problem

WILLIAM ROGERS

"Once the smell of a dip-
lomatic success was in the
air, the White House
scrambled for its share.
Nixon and Kissinger both
became personally involved
in the crucial next step:
compelling the Israeli gov-
ernment to assent to the
ceasefire, which called for
both sides to cease all mili-
tary activities in a zone 30
miles wide on each side of
the Suez Canal. Nixon, in a
letter sent July 23 to Prime
Minister Meir, made a
series of commitments, in-
cluding the promise that Is-
rael would not be asked to
withdraw any of its troops
from occupied lands 'until a
binding contractual peace
agreement satisfactory to
you has been achieved.' In
addition, he committed the
United States to the sale of
more Phantom jets and, for
the first time, sophisticated

By VICTOR M.
BIENSTOCK
William P. Rogers? Do
you remember the most
obscure Secretary of State
we have had since Truman's
Stettinius or Eisenhower's
Herter? Rogers may have
passed from the scene but
his impress on the Middle
East has been deep and
abiding.
If Rogers is remembered
at all, it is probably because
it was at his expense that
Henry Kissinger perfected
the technique by which the
president's national secu-
rity adviser undermines,
destroys and frequently re-
places the Secretary of
State.
Kissinger, as national se-
curity adviser with
President Nixon's ear, effec-
tively isolated Rogers in his
Foggy Bottom office and as-
sumed practically all the
powers of the Secretary of
State except the ceremo-
nial. When Rogers silently
departed the scene in 1973
after Nixon's re-election,
Kissinger assumed the title
along with the functions. He
saw to it that his successor
as security adviser was a
man who couldn't do to him
what he did to Rogers.

In the Carter Adminis-
tration, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, as national
security adviser, suc-
cessfully used the Kis-
singer technique to ham-
string Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance and usurp
most of his functions.

Now, in the Reagan Ad-
ministration, a national se-
curity adviser whose ignor-
ance of world affairs made a

carnival out of his Senate
confirmation hearings for a
State Department post two
years ago, has shown a mas-
tery almost equal to Kissin-
ger's in hacking his way to
power.
It didn't take William P.
Clark very long to dispose of
the pyro-technical Alexan-
der Haig as Secretary of
State. He enfiladed the
doughty general,
bushwacked him and
finished him off before the
soldier-politician-diplomat
knew what had hit him.
Haig was succeeded by
the likeable George P.
Shultz, a former Secretary
of the Treasury and of Labor
and first director of the
Office of Management and
Budget, a man wise to the
ways of Washington, de-
scribed by the New York
Times editorialist as "a con-
fident, impressive dip-
lomat."

.

But there is something
in the set-up of the execu-
five branch which gives
the national security ad-
viser an impressive ad-
vantage in the unceasing
battle for power in Wash-
ington. It wasn't long be-
fore Clark, who had re-
placed the unlucky
Richard Allen in the
White House post, began
moving into the Shultz
domain.

Clark, of course, works
with the decided advantage
of a very close relationship
with the President who has
come, more and more, to
rely on Clark for expertise
even in the fields where he
has little or none. The
President is appreciative of

VICTOR BIENSTOCK

the fact that Clark weighs
all developments and all
moves in the light of their
possible effect on the 1984
elections.
First, Clark took direc-
tion of arms control policy
away from Shultz's inter-
departmental committee
and had it placed in a group
under his own chairman-
ship.
Then he moved in to take
over direction of policy and
activities in the Central
American area by having
the assistant secretary of
state for Latin American af-
fairs "elevated" to an am-
bassadorship and replaced
by a Reagan political asso-
ciate who nominally will
report to Shultz, but will
have his own line to the
White House. To cap this
indignity, the President
brought Kissinger back into
public service to head a
• commission which will re-
port back with policy
recommendations. Mean-
while, Kissinger graciously

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