THE DETROIT JEWISH NEWS

46 Friday, January 9, 1981

Senator Levin Urges Reagan to Be Active in Mideast Negotiations

(Continued from Page 1)
option which is favored
by Peres' Labor Party,
Senator Levin's refer-
ences to Hussein are vital
to the issue and to the
proposals the Michigan
Senator made to the
President - elect.
After analyzing the Hus-
sein role and the Jordanian
king's views, Senator Levin
states in his letter: "Hus-
sein is vehement when he
claims that no other Arab
state will make a separate
peace with Israel and that
the Palestinians, repre-
sented by the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization, must
be a participant in any
regional peace process. This
focus on how to proceed has
diverted our attention from

the issue of what we want to
proceed to."
The text of Senator Le-
vin's letter to President-
elect Reagan follows:
* * *

Carl Levin's
Letter to Reagan

Dear President-Elect Re-
agan:
As a member of the Se-
nate Armed Services Com-
mittee, I recently made a
nine-day trip to six nations
in the Middle East and Per-
sian Gulf. I had the oppor-
tunity to meet with a
number of key political and
military leaders in the
region, including Prime
Minister Begin of Israel,
President Sadat of Egypt,
King Hussein of Jordan and

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President Sarkis of Leba-
non. I was able to visit with
American military person-
nel in the area and inspect
one of our two aircraft car-
riers stationed in the month
of the Persian Gulf. And I
was the first United States
Senator to go to Lebanon —
that tragic microcosm of all
the conflicts in the Middle
East — since their Civil
War in 1975-1976.
A full report of that trip
will be made to the Senate
in the near future. But I feel
compelled to share some of
my thoughts wiht you now.
My personal sense of
urgency is created by the
political instability and the
military volatility I ob-
served in the region. Ac-
cordingly, I want to offer for
your consideration three
principle recommendations
that emerged from my trip:
First, you should involve
yourself deeply in the Mid-
dle East peace process.
American leadership is an
essential ingredient if a
peace settlement is to be
achieved.
Second, American se-
curity assistance pro-
grams in the Middle East
need to be enhanced in
ways that do not upset
the military balance be-
tween Israel and her
Arab neighbors.
Third, you should renew
our government's commit-
ment to defend our vital
interests in the Persian
Gulf by whatever means
necessary. Such a commit-
ment requires that a realis-
tic force and command
structure be in place as a de-
terrent to any threats.
The United States has the
best — perhaps the only —
chance to encourage a set-
tlement between Israel and
the Arab nations that sur-
round her. Our historic
commitment to Israel, a
Commitment firmly rooted
in the recognition of the

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v7ViV),

vital role she plays as the
only democratic state and as
our strongest ally in the
region, should not be- al-
tered in that process.
Clearly, Camp David
taught us that peace can be
achieved by strengthening
our friendship with Arab
nations without weakening
our relationships with Is-
rael.
Camp David taught ''us
more than that. It taught us
that peace is possible and
that miracles still can take
place. The first miracle was
ending the unceasing hos-
tility which has encircled
Israel since its inception in
1948. The agreement be- -
tween Israel and Egypt has
tended to be overshadowed
by the difficulties in imple-
menting the accords. But
those difficulties cannot be
allowed to diminish the sig-
nificance of the agreement
itself. It is precisely that
significance which gives us
some hope for a second
miracle — a framework for
resolving the Palestinian
issue.
In this context, Mr.
President-elect, the diffi-
culties are clearly re-
flected in the four "prin-
ciples" for a Palestinian
solution supported by
many Arab leaders:
• Withdrawal of Israel
from "occupied territories."
• "Self-determination"
for the Palestinians.
• Recognition of the PLO
as the spokesman for the
Palestinians.
• Secure borders for all
the states in the area
(presumably including Is-
rael — but that is left to im-
plication).
You have recognized the
problem these principles
create for Israel's security
and already sought to
suggest one possible way of .
dealings with it: direct talks
between Jordan and Israel.
This approach would, in ef-
fect, take the baton away
from the Camp David
marathoners and pass it to a
new combination of runners
seeking the finish line of
peace. The idea has merit
but I do not believe it will
work at this time no matter
how desirable it may ulti-
mately be.

King Hussein will
neither join the Camp
David process now nor
negotiate with Israel. He
told me strongly that
Camp David is a "dead
horse" whose very men-
tion creates a negative
reaction in the Arab
world. Nor will he bar-
gain separately with Is-
rael. He believes that
Sadat's "sin" was recog-
nizing the reality of Is-
rael.
Hussein believes that,
when Sadat agreed to a
separate peace between Is-
rael and Egypt, he removed
the real pressure point
which could have forced Is-
rael to agree to an "accept-
able" solution to the Pales-
tinian problem. Addi-
tionally, Hussein is vehe-
ment when he claims that
no other Arab, state will

Israel and that the Palesti-
nians, represented by the
Palestine Liberation
Organization, must be a
participation in any
region'al peace process.
This focus on how to prd-
ceed has diverted our atten-
tion from the issue of what
we want to proceed to. Addi-
tionally, the seemingly in-
soluble nature of the prob-
lems associated with these
issues seem to suggest that
no product (in the sense of
an agreement) will be forth-
coming in a timely fashion.
There may, however, be a
way to "end run" this prob-
lem. While we continue to
move ahead with the Camp
David process between Is-
rael and Egypt, I believe it
would be desirable if we
shift our Jordanian focus
from attempts to involve
them in the process to an at-
tempt to try to involve them
in defining the shape of a
final product or agreement.
King Hussein told me
that a few years ago he
and the Palestinians dis-
cussed what form of gov-
ernment might emerge
from a peace settlement. I
found this comment
striking since it is at vari-
ance with his oft-
repeated public position
that his interest is solely
in securing a process of
pure self-determination
and not in what that
process produces. His
discussions with Palesti-
nians, on the other hand,
included product, not
just process.
I asked him if he was
going to continue such dis-
cussions. His response was
neither negative nor posi-
tive. It is an issue I would
urge you to explore with
him when you meet — and I
urge you to set up such a
meeting as soon as possible.
My hypothesis is this:
Hussein's exploration of the
ultimate shape of an
agreement, when combined
with previous indications
that he favors a confedera-
tion with Jordan as the
"best" solution to the Pales-
tinian problem as opposed
to an independent West
Bank state, suggests a
possible approach which
might help by-pass some of
the sticky process issues.
We may be able to leapfrog
the critical unresolved con-
cern with how to negotiate
and get right to the act of
negotiating.
If such an act led to a gen-
eral agreement on the shape
of a Palestinian solution —
and agreement between
Jordan and the Palestinians
and Israel even though they
never sat down to discuss it
— then the pressure for im-
plementing such a consen-
sus solution might create an
environment in which the
process problems were less
severe and more manage-
able.
(I do not know\ if this
approach will work. But I
do know that no ap-
proach will work without
the active involvement of
the United States. Every
leader that I spoke with
in6ltid hvg
s<< •

Begin and Sadat —
agreed that, without the
deep involvement of the
United States, there
would be no second
miracle and Camp David
would have no progeny.
The United States must
be involved if peace is to
be achieved. And,
further, the United States
can only be involved ef-
fectively if you person-
ally are involved in the
process. The political and
personal risks we are
asking the leaders of
these nations to take is
credible only if t'
President of the Unit .
States is willing to match
those risks himself.
The search for the next
step to peace will bedevil
you, Mr. President-elect..It
will seem to elude you. It
will be like — in the words
of one Jordanian leader —
looking for a soft spot on a
porcupine. (One of the
graphic symbols of the polit-
ical complexity is that Jor-
dan's official maps of the
region either leave a blank
space where Israel is or call
Israel "occupied Pales-
tine.")
But Mr. President-elect,
take the risk. The road to
peace goes through Wash-
ington before it can reach
Amman and ultimately to
all the nations involved.
Only the Russians benefit
when the cauldron keeps
boiling in the Middle East.
* * *

. Realistic Approach
to Sale of Arms

My second recommenda-
tion deals with the complex
issue of arms sales. We seek,
through our arms sales, to
strengthen our allies with-
out upsetting any regional
military balance: Often
those who request such
sales do so as much from a
need to - seek physical sym-
bols of our support as from a
realistic need for the arms
themselves. Our decisions
in this delicate area must be
based on our goals and not
the psychological (as op-
posed to real) needs of other
nations .. .
In 1977, the Congress ap-
proved the sale of 64 F-15s
to the Saudis, after explicit
commitments to the Con-
gress that such planes
would not be enhanced with
offensive equipment so as to
present a threat to Israel
Such offensive equipm
included bomb racks an
specially fitted fuel tanks
for long-range capability.
The Saudis are now re-
questing the "enhanced"
equipment despite those
clear commitments mae
in 1977.
Sixty-eight members of
the Senate, including many
who voted for the 1977 sale,
have recently signed a let-
ter to President Carter urg-
ing him to deny the request
for enhanced equipment.
President Carter during the
campaign vowed not to ap-
prove any equipment for the
F-15s which would give the
aircraft "offensive" capabil-
ity. You, yourself, implied
the same position. ,
(co;likued:Ori gage 41)',