80 Friday, Aupst 4, 1978

THE DETROIT DISH NEWS

American-Israel Relations, M.E. Crises Defined by Prof. Safran

American-Israel rela - "If the Carter approach
tions and the 30-year his - had a reasonable chance
tory of Middle East crises of being effective with
receive thorough analyses leaders of Israel's Labor
in "Israel, the Embattled government, it had only a
Ally," by Harvard Univer- minimal chance of work-
sity Prof. Nadav Safran ing on the new Likud re-
(Belknap Press of Harvard gime made possible by
University Press).
the May 17, 1977, elec-
The detailed account of tions. The Labor leaders
events that have led to the had at least had ample
current controversies, those opportunity in their deal-
preceeding as well as those ings with American lead-
following the visit of Anwar ers to anticipate Ameri-
Sadat in Israel, give this re- can intents and to think
sume of occurrences special of possible ways to ac-
significance at this time.
commodate their own
Dr. Safran's many years with them, whereas the
of studies of events affecting Likud leaders, especially
Israel lend authoritative- its chief, Menahem Begin,
ness to his latest study.
were disposed both by
The conclusions he ar- inclination and by habit
rives at are of special in- acquired in the course of
terest.
three decades of opposi-
The attitude of Presi- tion to be guided by
dent Carter, now the sub- ideological conviction
ject of much scrutiny and and always to think
Concern over impending more could be sought and
policies, finds interesting achieved than the Labor
definition in Prof. Saf- government allowed was
'iran's analyses of possible.
American-Israel rela-
"And so a situation de-
tions. Prof. Safran thus veloped in May 1977
describes the Carter ap- wherein President Carter,
proach:
who had pronounced him-
"In the United States the self publicly in favor of the
November 1976 elections pre-1967 boundaries with
placed in the White House a 'minor adjustments' and in
President who was deeply favor of a Palestinian home-
committed to open diplo- land, was expecting to re-
macy and was a firm be- ceive in Washington Prime
liever in the power of the Minister Begin, who had
spoken word.
vowed not to retreat from
"From the moment he as- 'liberated' Judea, Samaria,
sumed office, President and Gaza and to consider a
Carter gave top priority to territorial compromise in
„the need to advance a com- Sinai and the Golan only in
prehensive peace settle- the context of complete
ment in the Middle East and peace.
proceeded to work toward
"Although a confronta-
that objective by making tion between the United
declaration after declara- States and Israel appeared
tion stating his views on highly likely to follow the
critical issues of substance leaders' meeting, the resol-
and procedure and convey- ution of the confrontation
ing feelings and judgements before it did irreparable
about countries and leaders damage seemed to lie in rec-
involved.
ognition by the two of three
"Although the substan- interrelated principles, or
tive positions he adopted did rather imperatives, which
not differ much from the emerge from the realities of
known private convictions the Middle East situation
of his two predecessors and and the experience of the
of former Secretary of State two countries since the Yom
,Kissinger, the public enun- Kippur War.
ciation of these positions in
"These imperatives
advance of negotiations and are: the United States and
even of serious bilateral Israel must strive to ad-
consultations created an vance a settlement in
atmosphere of tension and a every possible way; Un-
situation in which the Pres- ited States policy must
ident appeared to be gambl- have a dual orientation,
ing on either a quick break- on Israel as well as on
through or prompt confron- Arab states; and the Un-
tation with one party or ited States must be pre-
another."
pared to inject major 'in-
So much has been said to puts' to make possible
imply that the leadership of Arab-Israeli agreement.
Menahem Begin may have
"Striving to advance a
become an irritation for settlement has become im-
American leadership that perative because the Arab-
Prof. Safran's description of Israeli conflict has proved
the contrasting approaches to be impervious to long-
between the Israel Labor term stabilization by any
and Likud parties is of spe- other means, and because a
cial importance. Dr. Safran new explosion of it in war
states:
could cause devastating

damage without holding
Is there a nuclear threat
pal respective concerns.
Arabs to seek from one or
any promise of improved
"Apart from the highly in the conflict? On this score
more of the world's nuclear
chances of settlement no
detrimental consequ- Dr. Safran has an important
powers extension of a nuc-
matter what outcome the
ences of confrontation contribution to make on the
lear umbrella over them ac-
war had.
and war, the United subject, stating:
cording to the terms and
"In general, the conflict
States has a very sub-
spirit of the existing inter-
"The argument was re-
has proved impervious to
stantial diplomatic- cently made that if Israel
national treaty against nuc-
stabilization because too
strategic interest in pre- were to adopt a nuclear
lear proliferation, and
many critical variables
venting the reassertion of strategy — that is, .to de-
would precipitate frantic
have become entangled in it
Soviet influence in Egypt clare possession of nuclear
collective efforts on their
to make control of all of and its recovery in Syria.
part to acquire a nuclear
weapons as a deterrent — a
them possible."
It has a vital strategic - stable framework for the
capacity of their own.
In his discussion of the economic - political in- Arab-Israeli conflict might
"This would give rise to a
three imperatives, Dr. Saf- terest in ensuring the un- be created. That argument
transition period of great
ran outlines his views on interrupted flow of Ara- is deeply flawed and fraught
uncertainty and explosive-
possible developments in bian oil to itself and its with disaster.
ness; and even if this were
the conflict. The Arabs and NATO allies. And it has a
successfully traversed and
"If the nuclear strategy
the impending confronta- crucial interest in secur-
both Israel and the Arabs
tions call forth this view ex- ing the cooperation of in intended to deter a war
ended up with second-strike
pressed by the author
Saudi Arabia in restrain- aiming at the destruction
capabilities, the balance of
"It has sometimes been ing the rise of oil prices, of Israel, then it is un-
terror would be highly un-
argued that strategic and a very important fi- necessary. The strong
stable.
depth and the resources nancial interest in ex- suspicion that Israel has
"Each side would still en-
commanded by the porting goods and ser- a 'last resort' nuclear
deavor to preserve its own
Arabs, which were cited vices to oil-rich Arab capability coupled with
second-strike capacity
its conventional military
as contributing reasons countries."
against perceived efforts by
barring stabilization
The emphasis thus placed capacity and American
the other to negate it; and
through deterrence and on the compulsive Ameri- commitments to its sur-
this would add the costs of a
making war highly un- can need for even- vival are ample to take
nuclear arms race to those
profitable from either an handedness is described by care of such a threat, and
of a conventional one while
American or an Israeli Prof. Safran as calling for all the evidence suggests
giving rise to frequent occa-
point of view, ought to an "external imput." He that the Arabs have in-
sions in which one side or
deed drawn the approp-
make the Arabs unwil- states on this score:
the other might be tempted
ling to settle and should
'The equation of the par- riate lesson.
to strike first."
therefore cast doubt on ties' crucial concerns cannot
"If the nuclear strategy is
A native of Cairo, a fre-
the sincerity of their be completely balanced aimed at deterring the
quent visitor in Israel, his
proclaimed desire to without an additional ex- Arabs from undertaking
studies of Middle East
achieve a lasting peace.
ternal imput. Since the Un- general or limited war for
events have been upper-
"This argument errone- ited States is vitally in- more limited objectives,
most in his published
ously assumes that what is terested in a settlement and then the deterrent will not
works. Dr. Safran's latest
bad for Israel is necessarily since it is bound to pursue a be credible and therefore work serves a valuable pur-
good for the Arabs and vice dual orientation, it must be will not be effective. In the pose in the present
versa (a zero-sum game in prepared to provide that ex- meantime, Israel's declar- decision-making period in
the jargon of conflict ternal input to make possi-
ing possession of nuclear Middle East history.
theory). It specifically ig- ble a settlement acceptable weapons would cause the
nores the other considera- to both parties.
tions cited that make it
"Sinai H demonstrated
highly unrealistic for the that point in every way. The
Arabs to aspire to the de- failure of the first try in
the Jordanian government
MICHAEL
from entering their country.
struction of Israel and com- March 1975 showed that
ZIMMERMAN
pel them to limit their aims. American mediation en-
From Israel Digest
In the past 10 years, over
A spacious, modern pas- five million people and
"It also overlooks the deavors could narrow the
point that continuing con- gap between the parties' senger terminal alongside hundreds of thousands of
frontation entails heavy positions but could not close
the Allenby Bridge to Jor- truck loads of trade produce
dan was formally inaugu- have crossed the two Jordan
costs and dangers to the re- it entirely. The 'reassess-
gimes of key Arab countries ment' crisis showed that rated by Defense Minister River bridges.
too, and that only the lack of trying to close the gap Ezer Weizman last fall.
The Allenby and the
The new terminal, built Adam Bridge (15 miles to
any alternative and the merely by applying pres-
at a cost of IL20 million, to the north), continued to
pressures of stalemate are sure and threat to one side
handle the growing traffic carry traffic even during the
apt to force them into incur- (in this case Israel) to force
to and from Jordan, sits on a Yom Kippur War, when
ring these costs.
it to move forward could be
flattened area of ravine- Jordan committed troops to
"The second imperative is self-defeating from the
torn badlands just north of action against Israel on the
closely related to the first point of view of broader
the Dead Sea alongside the Syrian Front.
but also stands on its own American interests.
River
Jordan.
grounds. It is crucial to keep
At times during the
"The resolution of the
It replaces the improvised War of Attrition (1968 to
in mind that what we call crisis became possible
structure erected shortly 1971) PLO Katyusha roc-
'dual orientation' has no- after the United States
after the 1967 war
thing to do with the inane succeeded in inducing
kets and Iraqi artillery
"Open Bridges" has stationed in Jordan were
slogan of 'evenhandedness,' Egypt to take another
become
a
central
tenet
of
which suggests images of step forward and then
literally firing overhead
Israeli policy relating to at targets. on the Israeli
the United States as a kind induced Israel to close
Jordan . In effect, it nor- side, while traffic still
of Olympian power above the remaining gap by
malizes the traditional continued over the
the Arab-Israeli fray, free to providing it with the
traffic and trade flows bridges.
dispense favors evenly or added security and other
from
Samaria-Judea
unevenly.
Israel sees the "Open
assets it sought in ex-
"It means rather that change for the passes and eastward and vice-versa.
Bridges" policy as providing
It
also
allows participa-
there must be recognition the oil fields it did not
an opportunity for Arabs
tion of previously iso- from neighboring lands to
that the United States has get from Egypt.
crucial interests in Arab
see that life in Israel, Judea,
"In the context of a com- lated residents of the
countries as well as in Is- prehensive peace settle- Gaza Strip.
Samaria and the Gaza Strip
rael, and that the pursuit of ment, the American input
are good for Jew and Arab
Arabs are permitted to
these interests in the years on the Arab side is likely to cross in and out of Israel but
alike, and constantly im-
ahead requires it to en- take the form of massive
proving.
Israelis are prohibited by
deavor to cultivate good re- economic and technological
lations with the ones as well assistance. On the Israeli
as the other and to seek to side, it will probably require
accommodate their princi- nothing less than turning
the present tacit alliance
into a formal American-
Israeli• mutual security
pact, on the model of the
American-Japanese treaty.
That pact will have stronger
validity than many another
to which the United States
is presently a party because
of America's long-standing
special relationship with Is-
rael."
The new Allenby termina

`Open Bridges' A Success