Purely Commentary
'The Dwarf from Amman'
It amazing what King Hussein can get away with.
This "little king" who had been branded by Cairo propa-
gandists, as "the dwarf from Amman," only a few weeks
before the Jordanian made a pact with the Cairo dictator,
while the ruler of Jordan called Nasser "the evil canker of
the Arab world," talks peace from one side of the mouth
while encouraging terrorism from the other. Yet he is
being catered to.
Washington pampers him, the United Nations humors
him, he gets arms from the U. S. He is the darling of ele-
ments who felt so sorry for the Oxford-educated chap; he
is so saintly when he appears before American audiences!
Yet, even as the UN Security Council was debating the
last resolution proposing censure of Israel, in some fashion
managing to criticize also Arab terrorism which was -re-
sponsible for last week's attack by Israel's forces on the
center of El Fatah hideouts, Hussein let it be known that
terrorist incursions will continue.
American policy in the Middle East, as has become so
evident, clashes with Russia's, and Hussein is being armed
to prevent him from becoming a USSR tool and ally. Yet
Hussein, while getting our arms with which to fight only
Israel, gives comfort to the enemy and refuses to adhere
to UN proposals for peace talks. Like Nasser—perhaps he
is again taking orders from Cairo—Hussein will not meet
with Israel under the direction of Dr. Gunnar Jarring.
History repeats itself—even the brief history of Mid-
dle East conflicts as they occurred in the last few years is
repetitive—and one needs only to turn back the pages a
mere two years to realize that the pattern of coddling the
Jordanian has not changed. For instance, in November,
1966, after the retaliatory raid on Es Samu, Robert T.
Estrabrook reported in the Washington Post on the UN
Security Council's censure of Israel: "A principal reason
for the unprecedented censure, which some delegates de-
scribed as one-sided, was the hope that the United Nations
action would help to stabilize the Jordanian government of
King Hussein in the face of unrest and attempts to over-
throw it encouraged from the outside."
The situation is no different today. Our State Depart-
ment wishes to see Hussein retain his throne. It is true
that he is the least offensive of the Middle East antagonists.
Btr in the process, Israel is the whipping boy; except that
Israelis do not accept that role and will not permit con-
.ion of a reign of terror that endangers the lives of
its city,ens and is directed at their children.
.
Many Factors in Middle East's Dilemmas
An unusual number of studies have been conducted to
deal with the Middle East situation. Numerous books now
are available on the 20-year history of Israel's emergence
to sovereignty, and even the Six-Day War already has
been covered so fully, in historical records and in fiction,
that the significance of that brief war has become an
acknowledged historical fact.
Foreign Affairs' January issue was devoted nearly in
its entirety to the Arab-Israel crisis, and numerous other
publications continue to review the events which have a
serious bearing on world affairs.
A major product in such studies is in the current issue
of Orbis, quarterly journal of world affairs published
by the University of Pennsylvania Foreign Policy Re-
search Institute. This issue of Orbis may well be con-
sidered one of the finest contributions to the issues involv-
ing the entire Middle East.
In this issue we have a review of the legal aspects of
Israel's actions last June, of the attitude of India, the mari-
time and other problems and the social differences which
make the backward Arabs such an easy target for the
Israelis.
The latter, covered in a major analysis of the "Basic
Factors in the Arab Collapse During the Six-Day War," by
Brig. Gen. Yehoshafat Harkabi, has already been
covered fully in our columns. This commentator, in his
concluding report from. Israel after his last visit there,
outlined the menacing factors to Israel and world Jewry
contained in "The Lie" that has been and still is being
spread by Arab propagandists. That report from Tel Aviv,
which appeared in our Nov. 24, 1967 issue, presented Gen.
Harkabi's views in which he showed how Israelis can work
together but Arabs have not learned the art of coopera-
tion; that lying has been a major Arab fault and Arabs
begin to believe their own lies after uttering them and soon
are deluded by them; that the Arabs' social relations show
an incapacity for discipline.
Gen. Harkabi, holder of degrees from the Hebrew
University and Harvard, who was chief of intelligence
of the Israel army from 1955 to 1959, may well be con-
sidered one of the world's outstanding authorities on
the Arabs' status and is an Arabic scholar who has read
more than half of the 400 books that were published
in Arabic on the Israel situation in the last 10 years.
His study in Orbis, a complete presentation of the
theme which we shared with our readers last Novem-
ber, deserves thorough study. If only the Arabs them-
selves would read it—and the Arab sources it quotes to
corroborate the conclusions—and take it to heart!
It is important to note emphasis in Gen. Harkabi's
essay that just as the American soldier is not motivated by
hatred for the enemy in time of war, neither is the Israeli.
But the Arab is motivated by hostility, and suspicions that
gnaw at him are part of his isolation and loneliness, his
failure to find assurance of unity in his own ranks.
Gen. Harkabi's essay takes into account many fac-
tors, and this brief quotation is worth studying:
"Falsehood applies to human relations, as, for ex-
ample, the performance of Nasser and Hussein on May 30,
1967 when they professed loyalty to each other and ex-
changed kisses. Three months before, on February 23,
Nasser, in a formal speech in the main auditorium of Cairo
University, called Hussein "the adulterer of the Hashemite
2 — Friday, March 29, 1968 THE DETROIT JEWISH NEWS
Arabs' Social Status, Their Resort to the Lie,
in Harkabi's Expose . . • Many Aspects
of Middle East Clash Analyzed
family"—a play on the words, A'ahir (adulterer) instead
of A'ahil (ruler)—to the great amusement of those pres-
ent.
"The lack of honesty in their public life and the ten-
dency toward self-delusion is well known to the Arabs
themselves and on many occasions they bitterly denounce
it. However, this generally takes the form more of an
attack on Arab competitors and rivals than of genuine self-
criticism. Its tendentiousness detracts from its worth. It
may well be that the repeated demands in Arab publica-
tions for the Arabs to equip themselves with a scientific
approach and to act scientifically may contain an aware-
ness of the need for objectivity. Since the tendency to lie
is not haphazardous, it cannot be changed by an order
from the top: as from tomorrow, no more lies! The whole
Arab ethos, ideology and self-image induces them to close
their eyes and ignore reality."
Footnotes to this quotation by Gen. Harkabi are worth
noting. He states that Arab newspaper articles which
emphasize "the virtues of 'National War,' styled on guer-
rilla tactics, by which Israel will be defeated . . . draw
false analogies from Algeria and Vietnam, pass the burden
of continuing the struggle to the weakest factor, the Pales-
tinian Arabs, and stress that the human element is bound
to prevail over technology, while failing to realize that it
is precisely the human element that is their great weak-
ness." A second footnote quotes Prof. Zuraiq who "deals
with mendacity in the context of analyzing their defeat in
the Six-Day War: 'Nothing is so harmful for our present
and our future as deceiving and believing in lies.' " And
Gen. Harkabi also refers to the Sept. 3, 1967, issue of
Ar-Risala of Kuwait which "attributed Arab defeat In this
war to lying."
*
India . . . Russia . . . Red Sea
. Third World
Orbis is so revealing in its presentation of the de-
veloping Middle East conditions that the current issue's
contents become invaluable for students of the history of
our time.
There is a very important article by Aaron S. Klieman
who calls attention to Nasser's desire for control of Aden,
of his eye on Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea
passage that is vital to maritime power and "represents a
focus for strategic interests immediately affecting Israel as
a regional power and the United States and the Soviet
Union as global powers." Klieman's essay contains this
warning:
"From the Kremlin's standpoint, EgypVs ambitions
in the Bab al-Mandab region coincide to a great extent
with Soviet interests and objectives. Placing Israel in
greater jeopardy would be of secondary importance to
the USSR, which is primarily concerned with securing
in the Middle East a major strategic advantage over
the West. Acting through Egypt as a client state, the
Soviet Union would drive a two-fold advantage from
control of the Red Sea approaches. In the first instance,
England, France, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia, all mem-
bers, albeit to varying degrees, of the Western or `neo-
imperialist' camp, would suffer reverses in their re-
spective spheres. Second, a traditional goal of Russian
foreign policy would at last be achieved. Access to
warm-water ports, with their value as bunkering sta-
tions, ship servicing centers and submarine bases,
would immensely enhance Soviet strategic maneuver-
ability, especially if such facilities could be denied to
the United States and its allies. Long frustrated by
Turkey and the European powers in her quest for con-
trol over the primary north-south sea passage at Con-
stantinople, the USSR in command of Bab al-Mandab
would be in a position to retaliate by denying or con-
trolling access to the presently even more vital east-
west passage from Asia through the Suez Canal into the
Mediterranean. When considered from the perspective
of the 19th Century European diplomatic history and
the British-French-American hegemony over this area
through the first half of this century, such a Russian
breakthrough would be truly revolutionary."
But it would be more than revolutionary: it would
mean a loss of prestige and power for the West, and it
may well be that only if Israel is kept secure and un-
harmed can the calamity be averted.. Furthermore, it be-
comes evident that it is in the best interests of the Arab
nations that there should be a strong friend in their midst
—a democratic Israel—to protect their interests. But it is
useless to hope for such realization at this time.
There are other matters in Orbis that need atten-
tion. For example, the analysis by Prof. Samuel Decalo of
Israel's great contributions to the Third World—the Afro-
Asian nations who have been assisted by Israel's economic,
medical, social, agricultural experts, point to progress, to
the making of friends who often come to Israel's aid in the
UN. It is a long and interesting analysis of a penetration
that not only bears fruit but offers a good lesson in inter-
ational relations. The tabulated UN votes on resolutions
which were acted upon by the UN show that the Third
World went along not with the Arab-USSR blocs but with
the West. Dr. Decalo reaches an interesting conclusion:
"It is of no small signifiance that an Arab-Israeli
`balance of power' appears to have established itself in
the General Assembly. No longer can that organ be
regarded as an automatic converter of Arab military
defeats into politicial triumphs, as in 1956. The imme-
diate consequence of this development is that, if only
for their own territorial and economic normalization,
the defeated Arab states must deal with Israel in a
more realistic manner. Several moves in this direction
have already been undertaken, the 'free' produce traffic
across the Jordan River possibly being the best ex-
ample. Given proper Third World prodding and the con-
tinuation of the Arab-Israeli stalemate in the UN, such
dealings may shift to weightier issues and assume a
permanent and institutionalized status. Even if this de-
By Philip
Slomovitz
velopment turns out to be the only tangible result of
Israel's improved stature within the Third World, then
her reliance upon the Third World's peace-promoting
capabilities will have been largely vindicated."
Richard J. Kozicki, University of Hawaii lecturer, an
expert on South Asian affairs, in his essay "Indian Policy
Toward the Middle East," presents data to show that the
people of India do not go along with the policies of Prime
Minister Gandhi and with the anti-Israel policies pursued
at the UN. This essay alone justifies further study as in-
spired in the Orbis collection of essays. Suffice it to quote
this from Kozicki's article:
"A survey conducted in mid-July by the respected
Indian Institute of Public Opinion on the 'West Asian
crisis' has revealed that two out of three respondents in
the cities of Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras oppose
India's extension of unqualified support in the 'Arab cause'
and maintain that India needs to take a 'more objective
and impartial stand' on the Arab-Israel issue . . ."
*
International Law, Israel, the Middle East
It is on the question of Israel's right to defend herse-
and to retaliate against threats and attacks—in the matter
of established international law—that William V. O'Brien,
director of the Institute of World Policy, School of Foreign
Service, Georgetown University, writing on "International
Law and the Outbreak of War in the Middle East, 1967,"
presents an objective view of what many consider a com-
plicated issue.
In his objective approach, in this, the longest of all the
essays in the series on Israel and the Arabs, in the current
issue of Orbis, O'Brien evaluates the long-range events,
the many developments, pointing to the danger of
new "rounds" and of the menace of resort to nuclear wea-
pons, declaring: "This real threat to the very survival of
the warring states in the Middle East points up the urgency
of a peace settlement ,which I believe must be based on an
acceptance of Israel's existence, the international status of
the Gulf of Aqaba and the independence and territorial
integrity of all states, Arab and Jewish, in the area."
O'Brien poses the question: "When may a state start
to fight in self-defense and what are its obligations to seek
the assistance of the UN Security Council and to advise
that body of its proposed or actual measures in defense of
its alleged rights?" He provides an opinion that needs em-
phasis and wide circulation among legal experts and those
who are perplexed by the issues. He declares:
"The rhetoric of Arab propaganda, foreign and
domestic, threatened the extinction of Israel. The re-
sources in men and materiel available to the Arab
armed forces seemed formidable to outside observers.
Had the Arab forces mounted a substantial attack
against Israel, there would be no question about Israel's
right to defend herself. In view of Arab propaganda
and threats against Israel, the deployment of Ahmed
Shukairy's Palestine Liberation Organization forces in
Sinai and elsewhere, and the activities of various armed
bands in Syria and Jordan, I would argue that a general
outbreak of guerrilla warfare, terrorism and subversion
would have justified under international law a limited
offensive war on the part of Israel—whether character-
ized as reprisals or a war of self-defense, depending on
the magnitude, duration and continuity of the hostilities.
In either case, Israel would have been required to in-
form the Security Council of its self-defense measures
and to have abided, on a reciprocal basis, with Secur-
ity Council orders and requests. However, given the
composition of the Council and the Soviet veto power,
Moscow's role in arming the Arab forces, the ambival-
ent attitude to France, and the past record of the Coun-
cil in handling Israeli complaints, one is forced to
conclude that Israel was "on her own" and could expect
no help from the Council.
"But the Arab forces did not attack. They were
content with a blockade which I have described as
illegal, announcements (of apparently questionable ac-
curacy) that the Strait of Tiran had been mined, the
interruption of about 80 per cent of Israel's normal oil
and other vital imports, the disruption of the status quo
which had survived for 10 years, and the deployment
of more troops and weapons into areas from which
UNEF had been removed—all this while issuing a con-
stant flow of threats to drive Israel into the sea. The
Arab states appeared satisfied to sit back and enjoy
Israel's discomfiture and humiliation as well as the
frustration felt by Israel's friends and all nations inter-
ested in the rights and patterns of behavior maintained
from 1957 to 1967. It became increasingly clear by tht
first of June that the United States would be unable k
find the broad international support she deemed im-
perative—particularly in view of her commitments in
Vietnam—to force open the Strait of Tiran and the
Gulf of Aqaba to international shipping.
"Israel has two legal arguments to justify the de-
cisive military action she took. The first, which Israel
had already advanced in 1956, contends that when the
collective security machinery has consistently failed to
provide enforcement action and to deter and suppress
aggression and other major violations of international
law, the individual victim of aggression or of the clear
and present threat of aggression has a right not only of
self-defense against attack but of pre-emptive, offensive
armed coercion designed to remove the cause of con-
tinning violation of vital rights and interests and threats
to its security. Thus in the 1956 Sinai campaign the
attacks and in opening the Gulf of Aqaba.
"Changed conditions forced the Israelis to add a
further legal argument, namely, anticipatory self-de-
fense, to justify their military contingency plans for
possible future conflict. In 1967 the Arab states, par-
ticularly the UAR, appeared to have stronger military
forces and modern offensive weapons, including missiles
(Continued on Page 20)